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Resumo
Neste projecto pretende-se explorar a implementac¸a˜o de soluc¸o˜es de toleraˆncia a fal-
tas num sistema de monitorizac¸a˜o de rede. A monitorizac¸a˜o e´ feita numa grande rede
empresarial, com um volume de informac¸a˜o significativo devido ao elevado nu´mero de
clientes que a empresa de telecomunicac¸o˜es tem a nı´vel nacional.
Por norma, na˜o podemos evitar todas as faltas, e´ preciso tolera´-las replicando os com-
ponentes do sistema para o tornar mais confia´vel. E´ necessa´rio fazer uma ana´lise deta-
lhada a cada componente, verificar as falhas existentes e prova´veis, e, se possı´vel, alterar
a arquitectura de modo a colmatar as falhas identificadas.
Para ale´m de efectuarmos a ana´lise a` confiabilidade do sistema, que foi o foco princi-
pal do projecto, algum do trabalho incidiu sobre a necessidade de melhorar a monitorizac¸a˜o
do sistema, isto e´, foi necessa´rio extrair me´tricas e indicadores relevantes que possibili-
tam uma melhor introspecc¸a˜o permitindo despoletar acc¸o˜es de recuperac¸a˜o automa´ticas e
uma visualizac¸a˜o mais completa do estado do sistema.
Partindo do estado inicial, o objectivo foi analisar detalhadamente o sistema: a sua
arquitectura, os componentes que o constituem e o seu funcionamento. Partindo dessa
ana´lise, foram elaborados casos de uso que serviram de base para a execuc¸a˜o de testes
ao sistema, permitindo retirar concluso˜es de como melhorar a confiabilidade e adicionar
mecanismos de toleraˆncia a faltas ao sistema.
A arquitectura do sistema foi analisada antes da realizac¸a˜o dos testes, resultando na
elaborac¸a˜o de diagramas representativos em diferentes nı´veis de abstracc¸a˜o, nomeada-
mente ao nı´vel da infraestrutura e ao nı´vel dos servic¸os. Adicionalmente, todas as ferra-
mentas usadas no projecto foram revistas identificando os seus objectivos e propo´sitos.
A realizac¸a˜o dos testes ao sistema permitiu delimitar a capacidade de processamento
de cada um dos componentes e identificar o comportamento e consequeˆncias resultantes
da injecc¸a˜o de faltas em situac¸o˜es predeterminadas. Os resultados e concluso˜es extraı´dos
foram registados e serviram de base para o desenho de soluc¸o˜es aplica´veis ao sistema com
o objectivo de corrigir as falhas identificadas.
Apo´s as modificac¸o˜es iniciais a estabilidade do sistema foi melhorada, resultado da
adic¸a˜o de capacidades de recuperac¸a˜o automa´tica aos componentes do sistema, isto e´,
ao ocorrerem falhas identificadas e previsı´veis, o sistema e´ capaz de retornar ao estado
correcto de funcionamento sem qualquer necessidade de intervenc¸a˜o humana. Este tipo
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de comparac¸a˜o foi realizada em pontos-chave do projecto com o objectivo de registar os
resultados das implementac¸o˜es realizadas em cada etapa.
A fase final consistiu em desenhar soluc¸o˜es que permitissem adicionar redundaˆncia
ao sistema com o objectivo de introduzir toleraˆncia a faltas no sistema. Foi necessa´ria
uma ma´quina fı´sica adicional e, antes de ser escolhida a soluc¸a˜o final, foi realizado o
levantamento do estado da arte relativo a`s te´cnicas utilizadas nesta a´rea.
Das va´rias opc¸o˜es estudadas, um subconjunto foi testado em ambiente de desenvol-
vimento. As soluc¸o˜es escolhidas para implementac¸a˜o tiveram em conta a facilidade e
aspecto pra´tico, bem como as vantagens e desvantagens de cada opc¸a˜o.
No final, temos um sistema tolerante a faltas, replicado em duas ma´quinas fı´sicas que
se supervisionam mutuamente tendo a capacidade de tolerar a falha de uma das ma´quinas.
Palavras-chave: confiabilidade, toleraˆncia a faltas, sistemas distribuı´dos, replicac¸a˜o,
disponibilidade, monitorizac¸a˜o
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Abstract
This project aims to explore the implementation of fault tolerance solutions in a net-
work monitoring system. Monitoring is performed on a large corporate network, with
a significant information volume derived from the large number of customers that the
telecommunications company has nationwide.
As a rule we cannot avoid all faults, one has to tolerate them by replicating system
components to make them more reliable. It is necessary to make a detailed analysis of
each component, checking for flaws and possible improvements and, if possible, change
the architecture so as to bridge the identified gaps.
In addition, our approach takes into account the necessity of monitoring of both the
corporate network as well as the system’s state. Regarding the monitored network, dis-
playing a metrics panel is of high importance so that there is an efficient visibility of the
system state.
The practical contributions began with the improvement of the system when there
is a single machine deployed, testing and reporting any and all options to increase its
reliability and fault tolerance. After the initial modifications, the behavior of the machine
was much improved. The corrections and software updates made the node fully capable
of returning to a working state in the event of the identified and predictable failures that
each component is prone to.
After these improvements, the following work focused on adding redundancy to the
system in order to introduce fault tolerance. It required an additional physical machine
and, before committing to a final solution, surveying the state of the art techniques used
in the field.
Of the several options studied, a subset was tested in the development environment.
The implemented solutions took into account the easiness and practicality as well as the
advantages and disadvantages of each option.
In the end, we have a fault tolerant system, replicated in two physical machines that
monitor each other in order to tolerate the failure of one the them.
Keywords: dependability, fault tolerance, distributed systems, replication, availability,
monitoring
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter serves as an introduction to the project’s motivations and objectives, a sum-
mary of the contributions made and to present the structure of the document.
1.1 Motivation
With the growing competition in Portugal in providing internet services and IPTV1, cus-
tomer retention is crucial for the providing companies. On the other hand, the complexity
of highly distributed systems that support these services tend to originate flaws in multiple
layers of the OSI model [14]. The intersection of these realities is something that provid-
ing companies should care about and invest great efforts to improve customer service in
the presence of faults.
A customer that experiences poor to faulty (or even inexistent) internet connection or
television service can quickly become dissatisfied, possibly leading to a contact with the
support call center, a visit to the customers home by a tech team or even the contract can-
cellation. In all these cases the company loses money in the process. The Network Event
Trouble Seeker (NETS) is a project that originated and is developed at PT Comunicac¸o˜es
that attempts to detect anomalies possibly affecting customer services and trigger auto-
mated correction procedures for solving them, hopefully before they are noticed by the
customer. This system was designed to help oversee the wired network, and includes pro-
cesses of filtering, aggregation and soft real-time correlation of basic network events. It
applies soft real-time detection of relevant patterns to these events indicating suspected
anomalies that affect either individual clients or groups of customers (common faults).
It is possible to take advantage of the real-time delivery of log flows sent by network
equipments to reduce latency in the detection of problems, enrich or create new processes
of detection, correct and / or deter problems affecting the quality of customer service. In
PT Comunicac¸o˜es, detected situations and evidence are forwarded to the Sistema Geral
de Alarmes (SGA) for analysis and correction by operational teams.
1Internet Protocol television
1
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In order to provide a reliable service to the company’s operation department, systems
such as this must be robust and provide reliable and consistent information.
1.2 Objectives and Planning
Since its inception, the NETS system has been developed only in its functional aspect,
with little focus on fault tolerance, i.e., any anomaly within the monitoring infrastructure
could mean the interruption or discontinuation of its operation.
The work developed within our project was focused on achieving improvements in the
following areas:
1. Visualization: in order to enhance the operation of the current system and the
implementation of changes in the architecture, it is proposed to extract and expose
in a clear and visible way, metric panels with indicators considered relevant;
2. Single node fault tolerance: it is essential to minimize the number of faults, and
identified faults should be treated as soon as possible to ensure the continuity of
service with the least possible loss of consistency;
3. Introduce redundancy: the NETS system is currently supported by a single phys-
ical machine, which represents a single point of failure (SPOF). To achieve this
goal, new architectures should be designed and analyzed to introduce redundancy
and implement an architecture with at least two physical machines.
Therefore, to achieve these improvements, the work encompassed the following ac-
tivities:
1. Study the existing NETS platform, identifying weaknesses and potential sources of
failures;
2. Produce software that extracts relevant metrics from the system to monitor its sta-
tus;
3. Define solutions to the problems identified during analysis;
4. Implement the best suited solutions to the system;
5. Test solutions.
In short, the overall objective was to achieve a more robust and fault tolerant system
whose availability and consistency are maintained even in the presence of anomalies. In
the event of a system failure, the system detects this failure, logs relevant information and
attempts to recover from the failure and return to a working state with the least disruption
possible. In addition, the implementation of fault tolerance solutions based on redundancy
allows the achievement of the intended robustness.
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1.3 Contributions
The main contributions to improve the existing NETS system were the following:
• The source code of each component was thoroughly analyzed to correct software
bugs and code refactoring in order to improve its performance. This analysis was
also useful to learn what each component does, how he does it and its dependencies;
• New versions of several applications used in the NETS system were available, de-
livering better performance, stability and more features. Their update required code
refactoring and some adaptations but the benefits were considered to be worth the
extra work;
• The NETS system is constituted by a variety of components, in which the failure of
a single one can potentially nullify the entire operation. Given that continuous op-
eration is a requirement, each component began to be monitored and, if any should
fail, they are restarted in order to return to a correct working condition;
• Several software applications were developed to test, monitor and report the NETS
system. Testing the system required developing an application that simulates the
incoming sources, in order to easily perform case studies and learn the system’s per-
formance capabilities. The monitoring and reporting software were implemented to
improve the monitoring of the NETS system and to log its state and changes when
a failure is detected in order to enable a better analysis and understanding of the
fault’s origin and details.
• Redundancy was introduced making the system fault tolerant. This required an
extra physical machine and a careful analysis of how the incoming stream of events,
the data processing and produced outputs are treated with the new architecture.
1.4 Document Structure
This document is structured in the following way:
Chapter 1 – Introductory chapter describing the objectives, motivation, a brief sum-
mary of the NETS project and the document structure;
Chapter 2 – A review of concepts related to the project area, ranging from monitoring
and real time systems to a broad view of concepts and techniques used in fault tolerant
computer systems.
Chapter 3 – Contains the analysis of the NETS system, architecture and applica-
tions/solutions used;
Chapter 4 – The proposed improvements and solutions are presented in this chapter,
along with a review of their advantages and disadvantages;
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Chapter 5 – The resulting implementations based on the solutions presented in the
previous chapter are described here along with their details and review;
Chapter 6 – This chapter portraits a comparison of the system state between ma-
jor improvements/milestones, showing the differences and benefits accomplished by the
implementations made on the system;
Chapter 7 – The final remarks and conclusions are presented in this chapter. In ad-
dition to a summary of the work done, some possibilities for future work are presented,
what needs to be done and what could be improved.
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Chapter 2
Related Work and Technologies
In this chapter we will review theoretical concepts and technologies relevant to the project.
Some of the topics covered include monitoring concepts, how it can be done and some of
its strategies, real-time systems, which types and characteristics of each one, and fault tol-
erance, detailing dependability concepts, fault classification, strategies and mechanisms
used, as well as redundancy and its place and importance in fault tolerance.
2.1 Monitoring Concepts
”Monitoring of a computer system is defined as the process of obtaining
the status and configuration information of the various elements of a com-
puter system and consolidating that information.” D. C. Verma [58]
The NETS system supervises the wired network allowing soft real-time detection of
event patterns that indicate or allow inferring suspected anomalies using flows of network
equipment logs, and then forward the detected situations and their evidence to a system
accessed by operational teams responsible for resolving the identified situations.
In this domain, monitoring in soft real-time enables the identification and visualization
of anomalous situations in a timely manner instead of having to rely on the information
released several hours later after batch processing or through channels such as customers’
complaints received via call center.
For information to be easy to see and noticeable, NETS uses metric panels to display
the relevant elements in a simple way to understand, avoiding excess / showers of alarms
that could undermine the monitoring of the system.
Monitoring has been discussed for a long time [3, 38, 39, 40], and its evolution grew
remarkably in recent years [45, 46, 53], i.e., initially, the available tools were restricted
to those provided by the operating system, such as top in Linux, ping, simple log files,
etc. This type of limitation has led to the development of applications such as Nagios1
1http://www.nagios.org/
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and Zenoss2, created by the necessity to address the lack of monitoring software. Even
though they stimulated the development of more tools dedicated to monitoring, they are
renown to have some use and integration difficulties, problems that tend to be avoided
and solved by the new generation of applications like statsd [19] and graphite [12], where
there is an effort to decrease the learning curve and ease of operation of such tools.
Presently, the effort is focused in aggregating and exporting data to metric panels and
presenting the information in a clear and noticeable way without generating too much
visual clutter minimizing fatigue in the visualization of alarms.
Generic Model for Monitoring
According to [58], there are several categories of information retrievable while monitoring
a system: status information, configuration information, usage and performance statistics,
error information, topology information and security information. The collected informa-
tion can pass through a chain of processes in order to clean the raw data, reduce its size
into more manageable amounts, and generate reports to be consulted by system adminis-
trators.
This chain depends on the structure of the monitoring system. Although there are
many different monitoring systems and products available in the market, there is a generic
structure that can describe most of them. The generic structure, illustrated in Figure 2.1,
consists in five layers of monitoring functions.
Figure 2.1: Generic structure of monitoring applications.
The data collection is performed through equipment monitoring and can be achieved
in two ways: Active Monitoring and Passive Monitoring [58].
• Passive Monitoring - In this type of monitoring, information is collected without
introducing additional work, that is, information is available through normal op-
eration of the system. The only additional traffic introduced in the network is the
necessary for agents or devices to send the generated data to the system manage-
ment. This approach can be used in any computer system.
2http://www.zenoss.com/
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Some examples of information that can be sent include log files generated by ap-
plications, the MIB3, which describes the structure of the management data of a
device subsystem, and information about the network topology which is usually
maintained by network protocols such as OSPF4 and BGP5, among others.
This type of monitoring can generate a significant amount of useful information for
the management system and there are several typical methods used depending on
the environment and architecture used.
• Active Monitoring - In contrast to the passive model, this technique assumes an
intrusive monitoring model explicitly requiring the direct inquiry of agents or target
devices. It works by sending requests to the monitored equipments, and waiting for
their response that contains the available information.
In this case, we are only inquiring for specific data which could mean lower band-
width requirements, but, in contrast, there is an added network load due to the need
of constantly sending requests to the device and waiting for the answers. Further-
more, this method can provide information that could be difficult to obtain using
passive methods.
In the NETS system, data streams arriving from agents who are sending data and
messages with relevant events are considered passive, while monitoring within the NETS
infrastructure, relative to processes, disk space, state of the JVM6, etc., is made actively.
According to [58], the Pre DB data processing has three main objectives: data reduc-
tion, data cleansing and data format conversion.
• Data Reduction - Reducing the volume of information by reducing redundant in-
formation. It can be achieved by using the following methods: aggregation, thresh-
olding and duplicate elimination;
• Data Cleansing - Cleaning the data by removing erroneous or incomplete data;
• Data Format Conversion - Converting the information to a format that will be
stored in the database.
The resulting output of the Pre DB data processing is then stored in the data store,
usually using a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) database solution that can have dif-
ferent designs: rolling, load-balanced, hierarchical database federation, partitioned, and
round-robin. The chosen database design is selected according to the expected volume of
information, but it is possible to have multiple types of databases operating in the same
3Management Information Base
4Open Shortest Path First
5Border Gateway Protocol
6Java Virtual Machine
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system to distribute the data load or handle different types of information, for example,
one database for performance statistics and another for security information.
The Post DB Data Processing is responsible for analyzing the collected information
and decide what is relevant to be reported. For instance, it correlates information from
different sources, and uses patterns to determine specific alarm situations.
The last section is Reporting, which can be composed by viewing consoles and mon-
itors that present the information in a simple and effective way, enabling system adminis-
trators to effectively visualize the monitored system’s state.
2.2 Metrics and Measurements
”It is not the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most intelli-
gent, but the one most responsive to change.” Charles Darwin
Metrics can be defined as a system of parameters or ways of quantitative and peri-
odic assessment of a process that is to be measured, along with the procedures to carry
out such measurement and the procedures for the interpretation of the assessment in the
light of previous or comparable assessments. For example, they can represent the number
of failures of a certain component, the load of a system, latency, etc., indicating how well
behaviors and processes are functioning, as well as their performance while highlighting
areas for improvement (weaknesses) and strengths within the system.
Monitoring can use metrics to diagnose problems, point to solutions, respond appro-
priately to change and allocate resources accordingly. But it is very important to know
what information to retrieve and how often to collect it, which can introduce significant
changes in the architecture of our monitoring system. While we may retrieve all imagin-
able metric every second, it may overload the network and make the metric panels more
complex than necessary. On the other hand, if we retrieve too little or erroneous informa-
tion it may harm our system rather than properly monitor it [58].
Some of the available techniques used in monitoring systems to aggregate and order
data sets are listed below. Each one has its usefulness depending on the objective, values
in question and situation.
The average is a standard aggregation technique which alone might not be useful
depending on the objective, because two sets can have completely different values but
with the same average. I.e., the set 3,3,3,3,3 possess the average value of 3, and another
set 1,2,3,4,5 has the same average as the previous.
Using the median we can get more detail compared with the average, given that it
separates the set in half after being ordered, indicating the values which separate the
upper and lower half, resulting in a value closer to the typical value because it does not
undergo many changes if there are many disparate values.
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The standard deviation measures the dispersion of a data set in relation to their av-
erage, that is, if the values are all very close it will have a low standard deviation, instead
of a data set with a highly dispersed set of values, which will have high standard devia-
tion. It can be used along with the average as a complement, there are several probability
distributions that are characterized by the average and standard deviation, e.g., Gaussian
distribution.
The percentile is a measure used in statistics indicating the value below which a
given percentage of observations in a group of observations fall. For example, the 20th
percentile is the value (or score) below which 20 percent of the observations may be
found. There are three special percentiles called the quartiles which divide the data into
four groups of equal size, the 25th percentile is also known as the first quartile (Q1), the
50th percentile as the median or second quartile (Q2), and the 75th percentile as the third
quartile (Q3).
The summary of the five numbers [21] is a descriptive statistic that represents infor-
mation obtained from a number of observations, being necessary to have the percentages
based on a random variable measured on a scale. It is composed of five percentiles,
minimum sample, lower quartile, median, upper quartile and maximum sampling. This
technique provides a concise summary of the observable distribution, being suitable for
ordinal measurements, intervals and ratios.
Besides statistical concepts, time series analysis comprises methods for analyzing
data in order to extract meaningful statistics and other characteristics of the data. It shows
the variation over a period of time, noting a measured value at specific intervals. This
type of observation should consist in a sufficient and meaningful time window to obtain
visible and relevant data. The data analysis requires its aggregation and to be temporally
ordered, and there is a large dependence on the time in which they occur. It’s an analysis
technique suitable for forecasting taking into account historical series.
2.3 Real-Time Systems
”Real-time System – system whose progression is specified in terms of
timeliness requirements dictated by the environment” P. Verı´ssimo [57]
In terms of real-time systems, we have three distinct classes as we can see in [36, 57]:
Hard Real-Time - Systems of this class have to avoid any kind of time failure and
can have catastrophic consequences when one happens. Example: On-board flight control
system (fly-by-wire7).
7Fly-by-wire (FBW) - A system that replaces the conventional manual flight controls of an aircraft
with an electronic interface, where the movements of flight controls are converted to electronic signals
transmitted by wires (hence the fly-by-wire term).
Chapter 2. Related Work and Technologies 12
Mission-critical Real-Time - Such systems should avoid time failures, where occa-
sional failures are treated as exceptional events. Example: Air-traffic control system.
Soft Real-Time - In such systems, occasional failures are accepted and do not cause
major problems. Example: Online flight reservation system.
Regarding monitoring systems, they can perform their operation in real-time and be-
long in one of the above mentioned classes, or, alternatively, perform in an off-line manner
through batching or with large time intervals, e.g., hourly or daily.
Off-line monitoring can be used in contexts where the systems being monitored do not
require immediate action should an alarm be triggered or and anomaly detected. While
real-time monitoring systems allow a constant and continuous visualization of the moni-
tored metrics, and enable the prompt detection of behavior deviations, outliers and warn-
ings depending on what is being monitored. This also provides the chance to resolve the
issue or forward to the appropriate field technicians enabling a faster corrective action.
2.4 Fault Tolerant Computing and Dependability Con-
cepts
In this section we present and explain the main concepts for fault tolerant distributed
systems, dependability and strategies to achieve robust systems.
In Figure 2.2 we can see a summarized view of the notions that will be introduced,
grouped in three classes, attributes, means and impairments. These concepts are an im-
portant basis to enable the improvement of a system’s dependability which is one of this
project’s main goals.
Figure 2.2: Dependability tree.
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2.4.1 Dependability
”Dependability – the measure in which reliance can justifiably be placed
on the service delivered by the system” J.-C. Laprie [34]
The dependability of a computer system is the ability to avoid system failures that
are more frequent and more severe than acceptable [4]. Some of the biggest threats are
faults, errors and failures. Next is a list of attributes that can be assessed to determine the
dependability of a distributed system, as seen in [57, 34]:
Reliability – the measure of the continuous delivery of correct service, can be ex-
pressed by the mean time to failure (MTTF) or mean time between failures (MTBF);
Maintainability – the measure of the time to restoration of correct service and can be
expressed by the mean time to repair (MTTR);
Availability – the measure of the delivery of correct service with respect to the alter-
ation between correct and incorrect service, it is expressed as MTBF / (MTBF + MTTR);
Safety – the degree to which a system, upon failing, does so in a non-catastrophic
manner;
Security – The measure of guarantees in terms of confidentiality, integrity and avail-
ability in service provision;
Integrity – Absence of improper system alterations;
Resilience – The ability to tolerate and recover from faults.
The most important aspects that will be addressed in this project will mainly focus
in improving a system’s reliability, availability and resilience. This is accordingly to
the requirement of delivering a continuous and correct service (monitoring) even in the
presence of faults.
2.4.2 Faults Classification
A failure means that the system presents an incorrect or abnormal behavior, resulting as
a deviation from its regular service delivery. These failures result from errors, which are
symptoms of existing system faults, representing invalid system states that should not
be reached. A single fault can spawn multiple errors and consequently multiple system
failures and a failure can range from different types of faults and even the combination
of some of them.
The relationship between fault classes can be seen in Figure 2.3, where it is visible
that some classes contain others, meaning that if a system tolerates a more general class,
it can assume that it tolerates the faults of the contained classes.
Faults can be classified according to different criteria, such as their characteristics and
how the component behaves once it has failed [57]. They can be independent faults,
attributed to different causes, or related faults associated to a common cause, usually
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Figure 2.3: Relationship between fault classes.
originating common-mode failures which is the result of one or more events, causing
coincident failures in multiple systems, e.g., single power supply for multiple CPUs, sin-
gle clock, single specification used for design diversity [33], etc.
In relation to the domain, they can be hardware or software faults. Design faults oc-
cur more frequently in software than in hardware because of the difference in complexity
between these two domains. This can be explained by the difference in internal states, as
the hardware machines have a smaller number comparing to software programs [48, 49].
Regarding persistence, faults can be classified as permanent or transient. Hardware
faults can be be of both kinds, but a software fault is always permanent. Software faults
that appear transient are in fact permanent software faults with a complex activation pat-
tern, which limits its reproducibility if it cannot be identified.
The most benign class of faults belong to the omissive fault group: they occur essen-
tially in the time domain when a component does not perform an interaction as it was
specified to do.
• Crash faults – Occurs when a given component permanently halts its operation, or
never returns to a valid state;
• Omission faults – When a component occasionally omits an action, failing to per-
form its service;
• Timing faults – Occur when a component is late or does not perform its service on
time.
On the other hand, assertive faults belong in the value domain, and are characterized
by a component performing an interaction in a manner that was not specified.
• Syntactic – When the value’s format is incorrect, e.g., a temperature sensor show-
ing “+Ad” degrees;
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• Semantic – When the format is correct, but the value is not, e.g., a temperature
sensor showing 26oC when it is snowing.
The last class is byzantine and arbitrary faults, being a combination of the omis-
sive and assertive faults, are the most dangerous and hardest to tolerate, usually involving
heavy and complex techniques to face them successfully. In this case, the system is as-
sumed to fail in any manner of way, possibly resulting in erratic behavior from processes,
not following protocols, send contradictory messages, etc.
In general byzantine fault tolerance in a monitoring system is unnecessary given its
non critical nature. But a continuous and correct delivery of service is expected. To this
end, there is a great focus on treating crash and syntactic faults, without undervaluing the
remainder types of faults.
2.4.3 Strategies and Mechanisms
To obtain a more reliable solution and increase the time between failures we can use some
strategies and mechanisms that enable prevention, tolerance, removal and forecasting of
faults [57, 4]. The use of these strategies and mechanisms should be encouraged in order
to maximize the reliability of computer systems.
The impairments to dependability are faults, errors and failures. They are not desired
and appear unexpectedly, causing and resulting in undependable states [34]. In particular,
the complete elimination of software design faults is very hard through fault prevention
and removal. Additionally, hardware faults, either permanent or transient, may happen
during system operation. Therefore, only fault tolerance can cope with residual software
faults and hardware operational faults. In the monitoring scope, fault prevention and
removal are irrelevant whereas fault forecasting can be useful, but our main focus is in
fault tolerance.
Fault Tolerance – Continuous operation despite the presence of faults. There are
several mechanisms that can help a system to guarantee such capability:
• Error Detection – It targets the immediate detection of errors in order to con-
tain them, avoiding propagation and triggering recovery and fault treatment mech-
anisms. It can be reactive, detecting and reporting error at run-time, or proactive,
whose detection and report is done at development time.
• Fault Recovery – The main goal is to restore the system to a state without faults /
errors [32].
• Fault treatment – Aims at preventing faults from being reactivated.
The main concern is having active redundancy through fault masking or semi-active
redundancy using error detection and forward recovery.
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Using fault masking it is expected that the system has enough redundancy to deliver
a correct service without any noticeable glitch, whereas error detection would reactively
trigger forward recovery causing the system to move forward to a predictable and ensured
correct state. Either way, faults treatment can be performed by reinitializing key software
components.
2.4.4 Redundancy
”A key supporting concept for fault tolerance is redundancy, that is, ad-
ditional resources that would not be required if fault tolerance were not being
implemented.” Laura L. Pullum [47]
The use of redundancy is fundamental to fault tolerance. It consists in the utilization
of additional resources that are not required for normal system operation. In computer
systems, redundancy can be applied in the space, time and value domains [57, 47].
• Space Redundancy - Consists on having several copies of the same component,
e.g., storing the information on several disks, different nodes computing the same
result in parallel, disseminating information along different network paths, etc.
• Time Redundancy - Consists in doing the same thing more than once, in the same
or different ways, until the desired effect is achieved, e.g., the retransmission of a
message to tolerate possible omissions, repeating computations, etc.
• Value Redundancy - Consists in adding extra information about the value of the
data being sent or stored, e.g., parity bits and error correcting codes can be added
to detect / correct data corruption.
In the present context, we will disregard time and value redundancy because they are
not a requirement in this monitoring scope, and will focus on space redundancy. For
example, it is necessary to have copies of the system’s nodes in order to avoid losing state
and prepare it for possible node faults, at which point a spare node will take over the
operation minimizing the system’s unavailability while the faulty node recovers.
2.4.5 Common-Mode and Common-Cause Failures
”A Common-Mode Failure is the result of an event(s) which because of
dependencies, causes a coincidence of failure states of components in two
or more separate channels of a redundancy system, leading to the defined
systems failing to perform its intended function.” Bourne et al.[6]
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The benefits of duplicating components can be defeated by common-mode and common-
cause failures. Common-cause failures are multiple component failures having the same
cause, and common-mode failures is when an event causes multiple systems to fail.
These types of failure happen when the assumption of independence of the component’s
failure is invalid.
Common-cause failures can occur owing to common external or internal influences.
External causes may involve operational, environmental, or human factors. The common
cause may also be a (dependent) design error internal of the supposedly independent
components.
• Design Diversity - To protect against common design errors, components with a
different internal design (but performing the same function) may be used. This
approach is called ”design diversity”[44]. Multiple versions of software that are
written from equivalent requirements specifications are examples of design diver-
sity. That is, the component requirements are the same, but the way the requirement
is achieved within the component may be different.
Two pieces of software that compute a sine function but use different algorithms to
do so are an example of design diversity.
• Functional Diversity - A second type of diversity called ”functional diversity”,
involves components that perform completely different functions at the compo-
nent level (although the components may be related in that they are used to satisfy
higher-level system requirements). The crucial point is that the component require-
ments are different.
In the case of software, functional diversity means that the behavioral requirements
for the software are different. For example, one program may check to see whether
two numbers are equal and another, functionally diverse program, might select the
larger of two numbers.
Common-mode and common-cause failures can effectively halt a monitoring system’s
operation, therefore, it is important not to undervalue mechanisms and techniques that can
aid in their treatment. For example, the input volume of a monitoring system is generally
high, but it can take a single faulty message to potentially render every machine belonging
to the system unavailable by crashing or generating an exception on them.
2.5 Existing Monitoring Solutions
Currently, there is a wide array of options and tools available to perform monitoring on
computer systems and networks, process logs, manage messages, etc., both commercial
and open source. This section presents some of the most relevant tools or solutions that
could relate with the NETS system’s work.
Chapter 2. Related Work and Technologies 18
2.5.1 Nagios
Nagios was initially released in 1999, making it one of the oldest applications of its
genre. It works as an overseer/monitor constantly regulating and monitoring the health
of hardware, software and the network using SNMP 8 as the default communication pro-
tocol. Nagios can monitor parameters such as system status, if it is up and running,
CPU/memory/disk usage etc., service status, whether a service is up and running, e.g.,
DNS, Web Server, mail server, etc., and other factors including room temperature, hu-
midity, among others. Nagios can generate alerts through SMS/email when the monitored
parameters exceed previously set thresholds.
The Nagios application is split in different parts, the main application is responsible
for scheduling and executing the service checks in a concurrent fashion, while maintaining
all state information and taking action when transitions require it. Additionally, the checks
are called Nagios plugins and are available separately, in which their use is recommended
but not necessary as they can be developed locally. The core add-ons include Nagios
Remote Plugin Executor (NRPE) and Nagios Service Check Acceptor (NSCA). The first
is used to execute indirect checks locally on target hosts, and the NSCA enables passive
monitoring, where Nagios is split into client and server application.
The usage of Nagios by PT Comunicac¸o˜es is restricted to its usual objective which is
monitoring computer systems, networks and infrastructures. But for the project at hand,
it has too many useless features, lacks correlation capabilities, and requires installing
software for the remote monitoring and script executor which is not an option given some
of the monitored equipment cannot be modified.
2.5.2 Zenoss
Zenoss is a monitoring solution similar to Nagios, includes features like automatic host
discovery / monitoring providing time series graphs on performance, event management
which normalizes data into events allowing users to set alarms based on the frequency of
an alert, it is ready for Syslog monitoring and SNMP/SSH.
The functional similarities between Nagios and Zenoss also mean that its usage by PT
Comunicac¸o˜es would be limited to its natural scope, therefore, it is not a good candidate
for the project.
2.5.3 Sensu
Sensu 9 is a monitoring framework written in Ruby 10 that aims to be simple, malleable
and scalable. Sensu schedules the remote execution of checks and collects their results;
8Simple Network Management Protocol - http://www.snmplink.org/
9http://sensuapp.org/
10https://www.ruby-lang.org/
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uses RabbitMQ 11 to route check requests and results. Checks always have an intended
target, servers with certain responsibilities, such as web servers or data storage. A Sensu
client has a set of subscriptions based on its server’s responsibilities; the client will ex-
ecute checks that are published to these subscriptions. A Sensu server has a result sub-
scription where the clients publish their checks results.
Sensu has a messaging oriented architecture in which messages are JSON 12 objects,
the ability to re-use existing Nagios plugins or other written in any language, it also sup-
ports sending metrics to various backends (Graphite 13, Librato 14, etc.).
This framework is an open source solution that has been actively developed in the last
years. At the time of the project’s creation it was not in a stable condition and lacked the
required features. As of now, it still would not bring any advantages to the NETS system
while having costs associated with its adoption.
2.5.4 TRONE
This project15 is part of a collaboration between the University of Lisbon, University of
Coimbra, Portugal Telecom and Carnegie Mellon University, and aims to solve problems
associated with cloud infrastructure, ensuring persistent operations while tolerating acci-
dental and malicious faults, and monitoring of the processes in an accurate and reliable
way.
To achieve these objectives, the approach taken was the preparation of a robust archi-
tecture with fault diagnosis and automatic fast reconfiguration.
One of TRONE’s components is the Fit Broker, whose implementation is in the pro-
totype stage, following an approach of Publish / Subscribe, replication state machines
using the platform BFT-SMaRt 16, public-key encryption, event channels with support
for quality of protection (QoP) and quality of Service (QoS) with different levels of fault
tolerance, publicizing the ability to handle large volumes of data, little intrusiveness and
ease of integration.
This project was taken into account given it seemed to fit the NETS system context,
especially the FIT Broker as a replacement for the NETS’s message broker, RabbitMQ.
After a detailed analysis we found little gains in its adoption. The main advantage was
the addition of intrusion tolerance, which is not the focus of this project, and there were
disadvantages regarding the broker performance because of the complexity inherited by
its algorithm, and the cost of adopting it.
11http://www.rabbitmq.com/
12JavaScript Object Notation
13http://graphite.wikidot.com/
14https://metrics.librato.com/
15http://trone.di.fc.ul.pt/
16https://code.google.com/p/bft-smart/
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2.6 Summary
This chapter introduced the definitions and context that will be the base of the project’s
work, including: a review of what is monitoring and how metrics and measurements take
part in that process, a brief definition of the different types of real-time systems and the
dependability and fault tolerance concepts that will be the main focus of the project’s
work.
Additionally, we perform a survey of related technologies that currently exist in the
market characterizing them in terms of its monitoring type, real-time class and what met-
rics are treated. The objective of this survey was to present the solutions that are available,
justifying why they were not used by PT Comunicac¸o˜es and, instead, motivated the cre-
ation and development of the NETS project.
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Chapter 3
NETS System Analysis
This chapter presents an in-depth analysis of the NETS system aiming to improve it with
respect to dependability, by applying fault tolerance solutions. The tools used within the
system will be reviewed describing their purpose, the physical and software architectures
are detailed and pictured, and a section dedicated to fault modeling and testing will iden-
tify some of the cases that need to be solved.
3.1 Methodology
The methodology consisted in:
– Analyzing the system’s characteristics: its architecture, components and software;
– Translating the analysis into diagrams, picturing: the physical and software archi-
tecture, data flow, processes’ use cases and dependencies;
– Developing software to aid in testing, monitoring, and injecting faults in the system;
– Executing performance tests to establish the system’s capability bounds;
– Reviewing the reliability and recoverability of components, testing their resilience
to fault injection and verifying, in case of failure, the consequences to the system;
– Analyzing fault tolerance mechanisms implementable in the system;
– Implementing and testing the chosen solutions;
– Comparing the system between milestones in order to expose the advantages and
improvements made possible through the implementations in the system;
3.2 NETS System Tools
This chapter will present and describe the software choices that were made when the
NETS project was designed to support the system’s architectural solution. Therefore,
they were already integrated in the system at the time of this analysis.
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3.2.1 logstash
Logstash [25] is an open source tool for event and log files management and process-
ing. It can be used to aggregate, analyze and store log files for later use. One of the key
concepts of this application is functioning in a three stage pipeline, input, filters and out-
put, that is, the events are received by the inputs, modified by the filters and transmitted
through the outputs. There is a wide variety of both inputs and outputs, e.g., AMQP 1,
elasticsearch [15], snmptrap, sqlite, TCP, UDP, etc. available for use.
3.2.2 RabbitMQ
RabbitMQ [20] is an open source message broker software written in Erlang [16], a pro-
gramming language used to build scalable soft real-time systems with requirements on
high availability and fault tolerance, that implements the AMQP.
RabbitMQ offers a variety of features that allows one to trade off reliability for per-
formance, including persistence, delivery acknowledgment and high availability through
clustering. It has flexible routing, as messages are routed through exchanges, which can
be bound to one or more queues and are responsible for delivering the messages to the
relevant queues depending on the data. After that, the consumers can pool the queues
for data. It has a built in capability to form clusters on a local network, forming a single
logical broker. It is equipped with an API with options to show information that include
the currently open connections, exchanges/queue list, exchanges/queue size, etc. and a
web interface.
3.2.3 Esper
Esper [17] is an open source event driven correlation engine written in Java created for
financial systems. Correlation rules are described in syntax similar to SQL 2, supporting
patterns that are defined and used in the detection of pre-defined situations.
In order to interface with the “outside world”, Esper also provides an extensible library
(EsperIO) of plugins for reading and writing events using protocols such as HTTP 3,
JMS 4, AMQP and CSV 5 files.
3.2.4 Graphite
Graphite [12] is an open source tool for monitoring and graphing the performance of
computer systems. Graphite collects, stores, and displays time series data in real time
1Advanced Message Queueing Protocol - http://www.amqp.org/
2Structured Query Language - http://www.sql.org/
3Hypertext Transfer Protocol
4Java Message Service
5Comma Separated Values
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using round robin databases [58], providing a web interface and API to both generate
graphics and extract values and claims to scale both horizontally and vertically. Uses a
naming scheme based dot notation (e.g. “metrics.hostname1.cpu.avg”), and has an API
to send data through TCP.
3.2.5 Statsd
Statsd [19] is a daemon that listens for metric measurements on an UDP port and aggre-
gates them, outputting statistics to another service such as Graphite. It works by using
buckets for each stat (which has a value, typically an integer) and periodically computes
the aggregation after a configured flush interval. There are various types of metrics, in-
cluding counters, timers and gauges. It is an open source solution.
3.2.6 Monit
Monit [37] is an open source utility for managing and monitoring, processes, programs,
files, directories and file-systems on a UNIX system. Monit conducts automatic mainte-
nance and repair and can execute meaningful causal actions in error situations.
Contrary to many monitoring systems, Monit can act if an error situation should occur,
e.g., if sendmail is not running, Monit can start sendmail again automatically or if apache
is using too much resources (e.g. if a DoS attack is in progress) Monit can stop or restart
apache and send you an alert message. Monit can also monitor process characteristics,
such as how much memory or cpu cycles a process is using.
Monit can also be used to monitor general system resources on local-host such as
overall CPU usage, Memory and Load Average.
Additionally, Monit can be expanded with M/Monit, increasing its capabilities and
providing monitoring and management of all Monit enabled hosts via a modern, clean
and well designed user interface which also works on mobile devices.
3.3 NETS Architecture
This section explores the architectural details of the NETS system, describing the advan-
tages and capabilities of the currently used tools and an analysis of the components that
constitute it.
3.3.1 Physical View
The NETS system was originally designed to be based on a single physical machine
(Figure 3.1) running two VMs6 related to the system, one for data processing and the
other as the metrics repository.
6Virtual Machines
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The communication between the virtual machines is performed entirely within this
physical machine without requiring an actual network, and only consist in metrics being
sent from the processing VM to the metrics VM. Apart from that, there are only two data
flows: one arriving to the NETS system from the sources and the other is the outgoing
alarms generated by the NETS system that are sent to the Sistema Geral de Alarmes
(SGA)/Web-server.
Regarding fault tolerance, the physical machine has no mechanisms in use. There
is no auxiliary power source, redundant network access or even hardware replication /
backups.
The failure of the physical machine or the processing VM halts the system and nullifies
the system’s work and objective.
Figure 3.1: NETS Physical View.
3.3.2 Software View
The software architecture is illustrated in Figure 3.2, and the following description has
key points related to this image in order to aid in its visualization.
Figure 3.2: NETS Software Architecture.
The virtual machine responsible for data processing receives data via TCP (1), they
have two distinct types: one according to syslog’s standards which are stored in log files,
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and the other type is relative to RADIUS messages. Both types of data are managed by
the ETL7 application, logstash, described in Section 3.2.
The ETL application is responsible for extracting the data from outside sources (log
files) (2), transforming it to fit operational needs and send the result to the message broker
(3), RabbitMQ, which in turn, communicates with the event processing engine (4), Esper,
responsible for correlating events and alarms generation. In the end, the ETL applica-
tion is responsible for sending the generated alarms to an external system (5), general
alarms system (SGA - Sistema Geral de Alarmes), and related statistical information to
the metrics repository (6) which is housed in the second virtual machine (Figure 3.1).
The metrics repository handles all the statistical data and measurements (7), which in
turn can be visualized through graphical tools and a web back-end, enabling a constant
monitoring of the current and historical states of the system.
The analysis of the NETS system life-cycle revealed the existence of three distinct
phases, namely the Inputs phase, the Processing phase and the Outputs phase. Those
phases are highlighted in Figure 3.3 along with the data flow within the data processing
virtual machine. The remainder and complementary UML8 diagrams can be consulted in
Appendix A.
Figure 3.3: NETS Operation Phases.
7Extract, transform, load
8Unified Modeling Language
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3.3.3 First Phase - Inputs
The first phase is mainly composed by receiving events sent by network devices through
Syslog and TCP. These events have soft real-time requirements (Chapter 2.3) given that
there are limited bounds to their use and validity, and they can be of five different types
which are detailed in Table 3.1 along with their expected rate of arrival and description.
The events arriving by TCP go directly to ETL radius, whereas the ones received by
Syslog are written do disk files, which are accessed by ETL syslog to parse them.
Type Description Syslog TCP Rate (events/s)
DSLAM Digital subscriber line access multiplexers X 20
OLT Optical Line Terminals X 5
BBRAS Broadband remote access servers X 50
STB Set-top boxes X 0.5
RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial In User Services X 150
Total 225.5
Table 3.1: NETS Source types and volumes.
3.3.4 Second Phase - Processing
The second phase is comprised by events processing and alarms generation. Events
are received, transformed and correlated to generate alarms in pre-configured cases. The
process is explained in detail below, with the steps taken by each application.
• Cadastro
Runs once a day to build client base information, writing the resulting meta-data to
disk files.
• Extract Transform Load (ETL) – logstash
ETL syslog parses messages from log files written by Syslog extracting relevant
information to be sent to MB RabbitMQ using the meta-data file previously written
by Cadastro to resolve the client’s unique identifiers.
ETL radius parses TCP messages extracting relevant information to be sent to MB
RabbitMQ.
ETL alarms and espermetrics send statistical information to the metrics repository.
ETL alarms worker sends generated alarms to the SGA and complementary infor-
mation to the external web-server.
• Message Broker (MB) – RabbitMQ
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The message broker serves as the main connection between components, behaving
as a consumer from phase 1 processes, receiving parsed messages from ETL syslog
and ETL radius, and as a producer for phase 2 processes, producing messages to be
consumed by ETL espermetrics, alarms and alarms worker.
• Complex Event Processing (CEP) – Esper
Esper’s sole responsibility is to correlate the received events, generating alarms
under pre-configured circumstances, i.e., a client that is constantly connecting and
disconnecting or several clients breaking up at roughly the same time and location
will raise an alarm.
3.3.5 Third Phase - Outputs
The third and last phase is the output of the generated alarms. Alarms are divided in two
parts. One that is sent to the SGA9 through TCP, with the basic information required to
initiate corrective measures. The second part is sent to an external web-server, by HTTP,
with the evidences that support and justify the generation of the alarm itself and, this
information is kept for future reference and consultation.
Parallel to this operation, statistical data is sent to the metrics repository for visualiza-
tion and system monitoring.
With this information and having identified the dependencies between components,
we designed diagrams that represent the software architecture (shown in Figure 3.2) and
the operation phases (Figure 3.3) of the NETS system with the relationships and depen-
dencies between components.
3.4 Fault Modeling
Fault modeling helps to identify targets for testing, making the analysis possible through
experimentation and simulating modeled cases. After producing the architecture diagram,
we started modeling the possible failure cases in the system’s components.
3.4.1 Stream of Events
Assumption/Requirement: There is a constant and regular stream of events.
Fault: The rate of arrival is higher than the regular load.
Fault: The rate of arrival is null.
9Sistema Geral de Alarmes
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3.4.2 Syslog
Assumption/Requirement: Syslog is always active, handles several sources of events,
writing received events to disk in the form of log files.
Fault: Syslog crashes
Fault: Syslog corrupts messages
Fault: Lack of Disk Space
Fault: Log files are deleted/corrupted
3.4.3 ETL syslog
Assumption/Requirement: ETL syslog is always active
Fault: ETL syslog crashes
Assumption/Requirement: ETL syslog receives a constant stream of events
Fault: Load is above regular level
Fault: Load is below regular level or null
3.4.4 ETL radius
Assumption/Requirement: ETL radius is always active
Fault: ETL radius crashes
Assumption/Requirement: ETL radius receives a constant stream of events
Fault: Load is above regular level
Fault: Load is below regular level or null
3.4.5 Cadastro
Assumption/Requirement: Cadastro is generated once a day, and serves as a database
for client information and to cross reference data received in events to identify uniquely
the respective client.
Fault: Lack of Disk Space
3.4.6 MB RabbitMQ
Assumption/Requirement: RabbitMQ is always active, serving as the central message
passing component, having a bridge like function linking the several components together,
from ETL to CEP and back.
Fault: MB RabbitMQ crashes
Fault: MB RabbitMQ high load
Fault: Lack of Disk Space
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3.4.7 CEP Esper
Assumption/Requirement: CEP Esper is always active and handles the event correlation
to generate relevant alarms under specific conditions, it is a critical component due to
being the sole responsible for the alarms generation.
Fault: CEP Esper crashes
3.4.8 ETL espermetrics and ETL alarms
Assumption/Requirement: ETL espermetrics and ETL alarms are always active and are
consumers of MB RabbitMQ, processing statistical data and sending it to the metrics
repository.
Fault: ETL espermetrics/alarms crashes
3.4.9 ETL alarms worker
Assumption/Requirement: ETL alarms worker is active and is responsible for sending
the generated alarms to the SGA where they will be handled by operational teams. The
details and link of alarms’ information is sent to the external web-server.
Fault: ETL alarms worker crashes
Fault: The SGA or the external web-server is not active
3.5 Fault Testing
Fault testing is performed based on the modeling made in the previous section. Faults
were injected in the NETS system to simulate the described cases in order to register the
behavior and consequences in each situation.
3.5.1 NETS Normal State With Regular Load
The system’s state under regular load was outlined in order to have a point of comparison.
In Figure 3.4 is shown the amount of messages received which is in accordance with the
information already provided in Table 3.1, i.e., there is an average of 225-240 messages
per second arriving to the system. This value has an expected fluctuation directly related
to the time of day, e.g., at night the number of events is lower than in the morning or noon.
In Figure 3.5 we detail the use of resources under regular load, i.e., the amount of CPU
and memory used by each process.
A constant flow of events is expected as a natural consequence of network activity,
both considering normal user actions and abnormal activities.
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Figure 3.4: NETS regular load.
Figure 3.5: NETS regular load stats.
3.5.2 Stream of Events - Load Simulation
The initial tests were performed in order to explore and perceive the NETS system’s load
capacities. By simulating additional load in each component and the whole system, we
can draw conclusions regarding their current capacity and future viability.
It is noteworthy to say that in this test we check for failures of all types, i.e., crash
faults if any component fails due to the additional load, omission faults if there is loss of
messages, queue clogging, network, etc., timing faults if the components are not able to
process requests in a timely manner resulting in loss of messages, syntactic and semantic
faults, given the extra volume and high processing requirements which may lead to invalid
messages.
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Test DSL
The evolution and behavior of the component when it was submitted to a performance
test is illustrated in Figure 3.6.
This component handled a load of up to 300-330 requests/s without any signs of dis-
tress. When submitted to loads superior to that limit means that an increasing number of
messages begin to be discarded due to being processed as out of time.
The complementary details are presented in Appendix B.
Figure 3.6: Test - DSL.
Test STB
This component has a similar behavior to DSL, as it is roughly the same process and
methods performing the message filtering. It is capable of handling a load of up to 300
requests/s, but higher loads will translate in an increasingly number of messages being
discarded due to being processed as out of time.
The evolution can be seen in Figure 3.7 and the details in Appendix B.
Test RADIUS
The RADIUS handler has no problematic situations up to a load of 1050-1155 requests/s.
After that mark some messages are lost due to being processes as out of time. This is the
component that receives the highest share of requests, but it is also the one with greater
processing capabilities.
The evolution can be seen in Figure 3.8 and the details in Appendix B.
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Figure 3.7: Test - STB.
Figure 3.8: Test - RAD.
Test ALARMS (Using DSL-FLAP)
There are several patterns configured in CEP Esper that can trigger alarms’ generation.
One of these alarms is related to the DSL behavior of the clients. When a client is contin-
uously connecting and disconnecting suggests a problem with its connection. This pattern
is called ”DSL flapping” and was used as base to test the alarms’ processing capacity.
The component responsible for the alarms’ handling can take up to 10-12 requests/s
before the message broker starts queueing them as it cannot handle such load.
The evolution can be seen in Figure 3.9 and the details in Appendix B. This image
is composed by two charts because they are intimately related. The upper chart shows
the number of queued messages in the message broker, the ideal situation is having zero
queued messages. The bottom chart represents the rate at which requests are being pro-
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cessed. In this figure it is observable that when the rate peaks its capacity, messages start
to be queued and will be delivered in an unknown delay.
Figure 3.9: Test - ALARMS.
3.5.3 Stopped Stream of Events and Closed Ports
In this second test we focus our attention on omission faults, i.e., if events fail to arrive at
the components for lack or loss of messages in the same network.
Stream of Events:
If there is no stream of events, the system simply waits for new messages to process
without taking any action. When, for some reason, messages are not arriving successfully
and the input is restored, there is a delay to process old messages that potentially generates
an overflow of requests, in which there is an initial period likely to contain a large number
of out of time messages, taking a few minutes to recover depending on how long and how
many messages were sent in downtime.
Individual components:
Within the NETS system every component waits for new messages to process. Messages
exchanged within the NETS system are primarily managed by RabbitMQ that offers de-
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livery confirmation mechanisms. These are not in use.
Generated alarms are sent by TCP to the SGA, and the alarms’ details are posted
through HTTP to the web-server acknowledging their successful reception.
The metric’s data is sent over UDP because the loss of some of these messages is not
critical, but there are no mechanisms that detect this situation, temporary or permanent,
e.g., if metrics are being sent to but not received by the metrics machine.
3.5.4 Crash Faults
Over the following tests the objective is to register the behavior when there is a crash fault
on each individual component. The main goal is to determine the consequences for the
system, its dependencies and if an automatic recovery is possible while measuring how
long it takes.
Crash syslog-ng
In the event of a crash, messages sent by syslog will be accumulated and discarded after
a set timeout. When and if the service recovers, some of the messages can be processed
as out of time if syslog-ng takes too long to recover.
Syslog-ng has a supervisor, in practice the child is the main process, the supervisor
is only there to restart it in the following cases: it was killed by a signal, it exited with a
non-zero return value.
When shutting down syslog-ng, the child process needs to receive a TERM signal,
which will exit with a zero return value and also brings away the supervisor process.
Meaning that if syslog-ng crashes in certain ways it might not be restarted, e.g., ”kill -9”.
Crash Esper
When there is a crash, the state built with the past events kept in memory is lost. Esper
is unable to retain the persistence / consistency in its base version, but it is available in a
separate package, EsperHA.
Given this situation, some of the alarms can be lost or never issued because the history
kept in memory is lost, limiting the correlations made.
While Esper is unavailable alarms are not issued, consequently, the components re-
sponsible for sending the alarms to the SGA, alarms and ETL-etl-alarms worker, are with-
out work, meaning that PHASE 3 outputs stops completely.
Automatic recovery managed by monit.
Crash etl-syslog
Syslog’s related messages stop being processed, and there is an increased risk for them to
be lost while being treated as out of time messages depending on how long it takes for the
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process to recover.
After the process recovers, there is a period of time taken to catch up because there are
queued messages waiting to be processed, directly related to how long the process was
unavailable.
Automatic recovery managed by monit.
Crash etl-alarms
The statistical information regarding issued alarms stops being sent to the metrics reposi-
tory. It is considered not critical.
The generated alarms stop being sent to the SGA and to the external web-server, those
messages are held by the message broker until the service recovers.
These situations can be seen in Figure 3.10, where, after the crash, a large number of
messages is kept on the RabbitMQ’s queue. This is followed by some time without any
alarms being issued, and then the recovery of the process is made. The queued alarms are
then processed and sent to the SGA as usual.
Automatic recovery managed by monit.
Figure 3.10: Test - ETL Alarms.
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Crash RabbitMQ
In the event of RabbitMQ crashing, it loses all the information in memory (messages,
queues and exchanges). With it, Esper also crashes, and cannot perform an automatic
recovery due to not having all the exchanges declared, meaning that it keeps crashing and
rebooting until there is a manual configuration of the missing queues in RabbitMQ.
Crash etl-alarms worker
If this etl crashes, etl-alarms will also crash and the generated alarms cannot be sent to
the SGA and to the external web-server. These messages are kept by the message broker
until the service recovers.
Automatic recovery managed by monit.
Crash etl-espermetrics
The statistical information regarding Esper’s activity stops being sent to the metrics repos-
itory. It is considered not critical.
Automatic recovery managed by monit.
Crash pg worker
If there is a crash fail in pg worker, etl-syslog also crashes. Therefore, the consequences
are similar having an increased recovery time because two processes have to recover in-
stead of one.
Automatic recovery managed by monit.
Crash etl-radius
Radius related messages arriving at the system stop being processed. Instead, they are
queued up for a configured amount of time before they are discarded.
There is an increased chance of losing these messages by being processed as out of
time depending on the time taken for the process to recover.
Automatic recovery managed by monit.
3.5.5 File Deletion/Corruption
In this test we take a closer look into assertive faults, both syntactic and semantic, and
omission faults, but specifically in files.
To this end, we check what happens when files are deleted or become corrupt, and the
behavior of each component when receiving corrupted or invalid messages.
1. File Deletion
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• Logs at /var/logs/nets/etl
No problems detected in the system performance, only the logging is affected
as no new lines are written until the processes are resetted or the log file is
rotated.
• Logs at /var/logs/nets/esper
No problems detected in the system performance, only the logging is affected
as no new lines are written until the processes are resetted or the log file is
rotated.
• Logs at /srv/syslog-data/*
From the moment a file is deleted, the events and data stream is lost and no
longer registered, i.e., messages are not processed by NETS. This situation is
normalized if the syslog-ng process is restarted or there is log rotation when
the hour passes, forcing the opening of a new file or descriptor.
2. Corrupt Messages
No problematic situations were identified regarding corrupt messages arriving to
the system and files used by NETS, because they are filtered by rigorous pattern
matching performed by the ETL applications and parsed as invalid messages.
3.5.6 Lack of Disk Space
In this test we check the system’s behavior when disk space becomes scarce or null, if
it originates crash faults, omission faults, etc. In order to perform this test, the disk was
purposely filled until there was a small amount of space left, and then we let the remainder
to be filled up by the system’s normal operation.
The following events were recorded as a result of the system’s behavior in face of the
diminishing disk space:
1. First, RabbitMQ starts doing flow control which blocks connections. There are two
types of flow control used, both work by exerting TCP back-pressure on connec-
tions that are publishing too fast. They are:
• A per-connection mechanism that prevents messages being published faster
than they can be routed to queues.
• A global mechanism that prevents any messages from being published when
the memory usage exceeds a configured threshold or free disk space drops
below a configured threshold.
Both mechanisms will temporarily block connections - the server will pause reading
from the sockets of connected clients which send content-bearing methods (such as
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basic.publish) which have been blocked. The intent is to throttle producers but lets
consumers continue unaffected. Connection heartbeat monitoring will be disabled
too.
2. If nothing is done, logging applications will consume the remaining free space. By
then, logs will cease to be written and requests stop being processed by syslog/etl-
syslog/etl-radius.
3. Cadastro cannot be written without enough disk space, meaning that Esper is left
without its database and etl-syslog cannot verify the clients identity in incoming
messages or it would do it in an out of date list.
4. The NETS system stops working completely.
At this point, recovery is possible after releasing disk space, rebuilding cadastro if
necessary and resetting the affected components or the hour changes because of file de-
scriptors/open files situation.
3.5.7 Bottlenecks
In this test we searched for potential bottlenecks in the NETS’ processing, taking into
account the time spent in each component. The objective is to identify the components
that are most prone to delay the process and find ways to improve their performance to
avoid timing faults.
The only component that was identified to be a significant concern was etl-alarms worker.
For the analysis of etl-alarms worker, small changes were made to its source code,
adding log activity in key points enabling us to determine the time taken in each relevant
action and the total time taken processing one message.
This resulted in the creation of an auxiliary script to perform the data gathering and
processing to create the required statistics. It produced the following results:
Results:
Number of samples: 1450
Mean Time of first post: 41.442295
2 outliers: [3037.799835, 133.379936]
Mean Time of second post: 46.744604
0 outliers: []
Mean Time for socket: 1.041185
13 outliers: [4.679918, 4.669905, 6.410122, 3.959894, 4.499912, 4.950047, 4.119873,
3.760099, 3.289938, 3.540039, 3.530025, 3.250122, 3.299952]
Mean Total Time: 89.532596
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Time is in milliseconds, average of about 90ms for each request, showing us that most
of the time taken is used to make HTML posts.
We conclude that its processing capacity is limited at roughly 11 requests per second,
given the mean total time for each request. Loads greater than this will result in alarms
being queued and waiting to be processed for an undetermined time.
The closing of already open alarms also generates load and traffic. This can happen
when an alarm is treated and manually closed, or there is an automatic closing given that
the situation solved itself naturally or ceased to exist.
3.6 Risk Analysis
An important part of any system is having a good understanding of the possible risks
and how to manage them in the case of their occurrence. There is a variety of risks not
worth mentioning either for their extremely low probability or irrelevance to the system,
therefore, we will try to summarize the ones that are important and/or relevant to the
NETS system.
In Figure 3.11 we classify risks taking into account their probability and severity,
enabling us to draw a line between the risks worth having a contingency plan and those
who are not. For this system we are taking into account those who are considered ”High
Risk”.
Figure 3.11: Risk Management Priority.
As a result of this analysis and in accordance with the tests described in the previous
section, we have produced Table 3.2, in which it is visible the possible threats to the
system’s dependability.
Having a risk table, we are left to produce a contingency plan to prevent, monitor and
handle the occurrence of each risk with ”high” threshold. For that, we will produce an
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# Type Probability Severity Risk
1 Higher rate of events in syslog Medium Medium Medium
2 Higher rate of events in etl-syslog Medium Medium Medium
3 Higher rate of events in etl-radius Medium Medium Medium
4 Null rate of events in syslog Low High Medium
5 Crash Syslog Low High Medium
6 Syslog corrupts messages Low High Medium
7 Lack of disk space Low High Medium
8 Crash etl-syslog Low High Medium
9 Null rate of events in etl-syslog Low High Medium
10 Crash etl-radius Low High Medium
11 Null rate of events in etl-radius Low High Medium
12 Crash Esper Low High Medium
13 File deletion/corruption Low Medium Low
14 Crash RabbitMQ Low Medium Low
15 Crash etl-alarms Low Medium Low
16 Crash etl-alarms worker Low Medium Low
17 Crash etl-espermetrics Low Low Low
Table 3.2: NETS Risk Analysis.
RMMM plan (Risk Management, Mitigation and Monitoring) for the risks that exceed
the specified threshold if needed.
According to Table 3.2 the threat to the system is relatively moderate. The most
concerning risks are related to the arrival rate of events and the crash of the processes that
handle their reception and treatment. Both these cases have been modeled and will be
addressed when presenting possible solutions to improve the system’s dependability.
3.7 Summary
In this chapter the tools used in the system were presented along with the system’s archi-
tecture and details of its workflow. Performance tests served both to realize the processing
limitations and to verify the system’s behavior in anomalous and/or extreme cases. And
finally, through fault modeling and the tests made based on the analysis, we produced a
risk analysis for NETS system.
In the following chapter we will present solutions in order to improve the system’s
dependability.
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Chapter 4
Solution Design
Pursuant to the presented in the previous chapter, several proposals and possible solutions
are presented in this chapter in order to improve the system’s dependability, as well as a
review of their advantages and disadvantages.
4.1 Proposals for individual component enhancements
During the analysis we identified several components that can be improved in order to
increase their reliability and/or performance. The implemented solutions will be specified
in Chapter 5 providing the implementation’s details.
4.1.1 Stream of events
• Incoming Stream of Events
Given that the incoming message flow is expected to be continuous and nonzero
24h per day, the implementation of an alarm if no messages are received in a de-
fined time frame could help speed up recovery measures. Otherwise, the complete
omission of events can be visually noticed in the NETS dashboard.
Another concern is the availability of the ports used by the NETS system. There is
the possibility of manually checking their status or using an application to monitor
them.
One way to check if a particular port is open:
nc -z -w5 <host><port>; echo $?
It tries to make a connection to the specified host and port and returns ”0” if it is
successful, or ”1” if it cannot establish the connection.
• Messaging between components - RabbitMQ’s Message Acknowledgments
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Since networks are unreliable and applications fail, it is often necessary to have
some kind of processing acknowledgment. Sometimes it is only necessary to ac-
knowledge the fact that a message has been received. Sometimes acknowledgments
mean that a message was validated and processed by a consumer, for example, ver-
ified as having mandatory data and persisted to a data store or indexed.
This situation is very common, AMQP has a built-in feature called message ac-
knowledgments (sometimes referred to as acks) that consumers can use to confirm
message delivery and/or processing. If an application crashes (the AMQP broker
notices this when the connection is closed), if an acknowledgment for a message
was expected but not received by the AMQP broker, the message is re-queued (and
possibly immediately delivered to another consumer, if any exists).
4.1.2 Crash syslog-ng
A simple improvement that can increase syslog-ng’s dependability is by adding it to monit
along with the other processes that are already monitored in the NETS context.
The only modification needed is the creation of a monit file with syslog-ng’s related
rules and information regarding the file that maintains the pid of the current syslog-ng
process.
4.1.3 Crash Esper
If there is the need for fail-over and/or recovery capability, then EsperHA (Esper High
Availability) can be an option. EsperHA is a complete solution for zero-downtime CEP
and event series processing. It combines Esper with high performance resilience options.
It uses incremental backup that only write state changes. Recovery algorithms read
the newest state up to the latest state since last checkpoint and never replay or read old
unnecessary state. EsperHA supports a full-backup-only mode. Throughput in events-
per-second with resilience is very close to throughput without resilience [17].
There is a monetary concern in the adoption of this additional package, as it might not
be mandatory or even necessary depending on the final system architecture.
4.1.4 Crash RabbitMQ
Similarly to syslog-ng, RabbitMQ’s state can be monitored by monit, only requiring the
addition of its rules and details to the monit’s configuration.
One consequence of RabbitMQ’s crash is Esper crashing along with it, but Esper can
recover if there is a cluster of RabbitMQs, instead of losing everything, information about
the exchanges and queues survive given that there is one correct machine in the cluster,
enables Esper to recover automatically.
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Additionally, queues and exchanges are configured as transient but can be declared as
durable, which would prevent their disappearance when Esper crashes or restarts.
A durable queue stores messages if there are no connected consumers available to
process the messages at the time they are published.
An exchange does not store messages. They can be marked as durable but all that
really means is that the exchange itself will still be there if the broker restarts, but it does
not mean that any messages sent to that exchange are automatically persisted.
From RabbitMQ documentation [20]:
• Durability (exchanges survive broker restart)
• Auto-delete (exchange is deleted when all queues have finished using it)
• Arguments (these are broker-dependent)
Exchanges can be durable or transient. Durable exchanges survive broker restart whereas
transient exchanges do not (they have to be redeclared when broker comes back online).
4.1.5 File Deletion/Corruption
First, we need to understand how files and handlers work in Linux, which is the operating
system used in the NETS system.
If the file is moved (in the same file-system) or renamed, then the file handle remains
open and can still be used to read and write the file.
If the file is deleted, the file handle remains open and can still be used. The file will
not really be deleted until the last handle is closed.
If the file is replaced by a new file, it depends exactly how. Either the file is overwrit-
ten, in which case the file handle will still be valid and access the new file, or the existing
file is unlinked and a new one created with the same name, in which case it is the same as
deletion (see above).
In general, once the file is open, the file is open, and nobody changing the directory
structure can change that - they can move, rename the file, or put something else in its
place, it simply remains open.
In Unix there is no delete, only unlink(), which makes sense as it does not necessarily
delete the file - just removes the link from the directory.
One possible solution for the case in study is reloading syslog, forcing the service to
read its configuration file again. This operation re-creates the files / links and everything
goes back to normal. Files and logs that were deleted are re-created and work resumes.
Possible solution:
”sudo service syslog-ng reload” or ”sudo killall -HUP syslog-ng”
The only concern is how we can detect the need to do the reload.
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4.1.6 Lack of Disk Space
Disk space is monitored by RabbitMQ, avoiding the need to implement additional mech-
anisms to do this task, although monit is also able to perform it easily. We could make a
temporal prediction of disk space exhaustion using the already available metrics of free
and used disk space.
Another detected situation is frequent log writing by Esper. The following lines are
added to ”engine.log” and ”audit.log” whenever Esper makes a new connection:
2014-01-08,16:18:51.226,INFO,com.espertech.esper.epl.db.ConnectionCache,.makeNew
Obtaining new connection and statement
2014-01-08,16:18:51.227,INFO,com.espertech.esper.epl.db.ConnectionCache,.close Clos-
ing statement and connection
This is embedded in Esper’s source code and, currently, there is nothing that can be
done to prevent this from happening besides editing the source and recompiling the whole
Esper’s jar file. We concluded that this procedure was unnecessary as there are plans to
reduce the frequency of connections and the benefits are not significant.
4.2 Redundancy Analysis
In this section we will analyze if byzantine fault tolerance is needed, the challenges of
common-cause and common-mode failures, and solutions to provide input and output
safety and redundancy guarantees.
We will also review a number of architectures as possible candidates implementable
in the NETS system, describing their details and comparing their advantages and disad-
vantages.
4.2.1 Byzantine Fault Tolerance / Arbitrary Faults
Byzantine fault tolerance was not an absolute necessity in NETS given that the system is
not critical and its data output does not have catastrophic consequences if it fails for some
reason.
Either way, the misbehavior of a component should be detected and adequate action
performed to restore the system to a correct working state. If the fault is known, specific
measures targeting that very fault should be used, but in the event of an arbitrary fault it
should be enough to detect it and restart the component in order to correct its state.
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How it could be done
When a byzantine fault occurs, the system may respond in any unpredictable way, unless
it is prepared to have byzantine fault tolerance. These faults can range from invalid input
being fed into the NETS system to alarms being erroneously produced in the inner data
processing.
As seen on Lamport’s byzantine generals problem [31], a possible approach would be
adding processes to the system, i.e., a solution could be found with a system with n >=
3t + 1, where n is the number of the processes in the system and t is the number of faulty
processes. A correct operation can be ensured if the faulty processes represent less than
one third of the total.
These processes would work with each other, agreeing on the messages received and
outputs produced, enabling voting on each generated message. A practical example would
be a cluster (Figure 4.1) in NETS where all the machines process the flow of events and
generate alarms. These alarms would be subject of a voting to ensure that the produced
alarm is indeed correct. The inputs received by the NETS system could be treated in a
similar fashion.
Figure 4.1: BFT Architecture.
4.2.2 Common-Cause / Common-Mode Faults
The NETS system’s stream of events is sent from a small and restricted number of IP
addresses, but can change throughout time. These machines are configured to send the
event’s data to a specific IP address corresponding to a NETS machine.
The data processing machine in the NETS system receives two types of messages that
pass through syslog-ng’s filter, and are discarded if they are not according to the template.
After this initial filter, the respective ETL (radius / syslog) applies another filter that
checks the syntax and values of the received message. If the message is valid and has a
proper client number it is forwarded to the message broker for processing, otherwise the
message is discarded.
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In the tests made (described in the previous section), no problematic cases were iden-
tified. In the event of an invalid input leading to the crash of the etl or syslog, this situation
is promptly detected and the process is restarted in a matter of seconds and continues to
work regularly with minimal impact to the system.
A failure in these components is not considered serious given their swift recovery. The
machine itself does not crash because of these processes.
The use of diversification (described in section 2.4.5) in the NETS system may be con-
ditioned due to the cost of producing this type of mechanism. The severity and probability
of occurring versus resilience / need to run 24/7, means that a simpler but sufficiently re-
liable and stable system is preferable.
As seen in the literature [6], this type of system is generally used in NASA or in
building nuclear reactors. In these cases the failure may have catastrophic consequences,
which leads to mandatory prevention and fault tolerance in every component, including
Byzantine faults.
4.2.3 Input Handling
As we have just described in the previous section, the stream of events comes from several
sources. Given the nature of some of the equipments used, it is only feasible to configure
these sources to send their information to one IP address.
We will now describe some of the options available for adding fault tolerance to the
arriving stream.
Port Mirroring
Port mirroring is used on a network switch to send a copy of network packets seen on
one switch port to a network monitoring connection on another switch port. This is com-
monly used for network appliances that require monitoring of network traffic, such as an
intrusion detection system, passive probe or real user monitoring technology.
Network engineers or administrators use port mirroring to analyze and debug data or
diagnose errors on a network. It helps the administrator keep a close eye on network
performance and will alert them when problems occur. It can be used to mirror either
inbound or outbound traffic (or both) on single or multiple interfaces.
In the NETS system specific case, port mirroring could be used to deliver the same
stream of events to two different physical machines, effectively cloning it. Having the
advantage that this would make the configured switch responsible for the distribution
task, but being a low level hardware device, the probability of failure, or mean time before
failure (MTBF), would be substantially lower than a regular server. This would also make
this equipment a single point of failure in the NETS system.
An additional advantage is lacking the need of acquiring extra hardware, instead it
requires reconfiguring an existing one.
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Load Distributer
Another option involves an additional physical machine that would serve as a distributer.
This node would receive the stream of events and propagate it to the remaining nodes of
the NETS system.
The advantage of this approach is the fact that this machine would be a lighter and
more reliable node in comparison to the remainders, making its probability of failure
lower. But, either way, the cluster would depend on its correctness and availability, mak-
ing it a single point of failure.
Dynamic IP
Figure 4.2: Dynamic IP.
Alternatively, given that the events are sent to a single IP address set to the primary
machine on the NETS cluster, in the event of the crash or malfunction of this machine,
that IP address is assigned to another correct machine, effectively taking its place as the
primary (Figure 4.2). Only the ETLs of the primary node perform stream filtering, and we
use RabbitMQ’s mirrored queues to propagate the messages to the other cluster members
in order to achieve an updated state regarding Esper.
This requires constant monitoring of the primary and a mechanism that can handle the
necessary configuration changes when the IPs need to be changed.
The advantage is that no extra hardware is needed and all the configuration is done in
NETS system’s machines. Additionally, when one machine crashes, there is only a brief
unavailability while the IP update is done, and the machine that took over should have the
same or a very similar state to the primary before crashing.
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4.2.4 Output Conciliation
Two options were considered: using a single output stream, assuming it is trustworthy, or
using a more complex algorithm involving voting.
The alarms are generated taking into account the received events, if two machines
receive the same stream simultaneously, they should produce exactly the same output.
This situation is nearly impossible to guarantee, whereas a very similar or even the same
result would be produced with less strict temporal limits.
There are some cases in which the output could diverge, i.e., a difference in the ma-
chine’s clock could lead to missed alarms or different messages’ order also leading to
generating extra alarms or missing some.
These situations were discussed with the company’s project manager and were con-
sidered to be acceptable. Losing some alarms is not critical, and most of them should not
be affected because as they are detected by patterns that tend to repeat themselves, only
leads to a slight delay in their detection.
Using a Single Output
The entire cluster processes data, but only the output of one machine is taken into account
and sent to the SGA. In the event of a failure, one of the remaining machines takes over
and starts sending its alarms to the SGA without delay.
With this solution, there can be a brief period, between detecting the failure of the
current sender and switching that role to other machine, where alarms are not being pro-
duced. The alarms are not being produced but their loss can be avoided if we enable
the acknowledgments option of RabbitMQ. This way, the alarms are sent but only erased
when there is an acknowledge from the SGA.
Deciding the Output Through Consensus
We could implement a consensus algorithm where all the machines vote on the output.
But it would generate additional overhead and tamper with the alarms’ generation perfor-
mance.
Having all the machines generating alarms and using a log or table to keep track of
the issued alarms would provide a way to discard the already seen or sent alarms to the
SGA.
4.2.5 Architectures
In this section we will present a number of architectures that were considered as poten-
tial options to be implemented in the NETS system. In each of them there will be an
evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages of adopting each architecture.
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The amount of detail poured in each architectural analysis will be related with its
perceived viability and usefulness.
Option 1
The simplest architecture is composed by two physical machines to provide the minimum
redundancy needed for tolerating a single fault.
Both machines receive the event stream from the sources and process the incoming
messages, but only one of them produces an output, e.g., Esper processes and correlates
events independently in each machine, but only the primary sends the generated alarms
to the SGA.
This can be achieved with port mirroring described in the previous section and a rep-
resentation of the architecture seen in Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3: Architecture 1.
Option 2
A similar architecture to Option 1 would also consist in two physical machines, but if it is
not possible to configure the network equipments to do port mirroring, we can configure
dynamic IP addressing as described in the previous section (Figure 4.4).
The stream of events remains configured to one IP address which is the primary in
the NETS system, in the event of the primary crashing, the IP would be taken over by
an equivalent but correct machine. Both machines would have the same state taking
advantage of RabbitMQ’s mirrored queues.
This approach has the advantage that only one of the machines is filtering the incoming
stream of events and sending the alarms to the SGA, but both of them perform event
correlation to keep an updated Esper state.
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Figure 4.4: Architecture 2.
Option 3
An alternative would consist in adding an extra machine responsible for distributing the
stream of events to the NETS’ processing cluster (Figure 4.5).
This machine would only distribute the incoming stream of events to every node of
the processing cluster, becoming the single point of failure. Its unavailability would com-
promise the whole operation but given the less complex software it is expected to have
higher reliability than the rest, i.e., a bigger mean time before failure (MTBF).
Option 4
A more complex solution involves load distributors and two clusters, combining the ele-
ments from Option 2 and 3.
Basically, we could extend Option 3, but instead of only having a cluster of data
processing machines, the distribution machine would also be replicated and given a cluster
using Option 2’s virtual IP for availability and redundancy.
This would effectively remove the single point of failure, but would require extra
hardware, a more complex algorithm and applications to manage every replica.
An illustration of this architecture can be seen in Figure 4.6.
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Figure 4.5: Architecture 3.
4.3 Proposals for Fault Tolerance Enhancements at Sys-
tem Level
4.3.1 Port Mirroring
Port mirroring is an option that requires the reconfiguration of the network switch where
the NETS system servers are physically located. This process could be attempted but
requires contacting other departments and teams to approve and perform the required
changes.
The fact that it involves external actions can delay and complicate the adoption of this
method, making the other options more suitable for the task at hand.
4.3.2 Load Distributor
This second option requires acquiring an extra machine to be assigned as a load distrib-
utor. One disadvantage is the additional management required to install, configure and
maintain the new hardware.
There is also a bureaucratic process attached to grant the extra equipment that can be
lengthy and difficult, making this an even less probable choice than port mirroring.
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Figure 4.6: Architecture 4.
4.3.3 Virtual IP
A Virtual IP (VIP) can be used for connection redundancy by providing alternative fail-
over options on one machine; a VIP address may still be available if a computer or NIC
(Network Interface Controller) fails, because an alternative computer or NIC replies to
connections replacing the failed one.
There is software available to perform this task, e.g., Keepalived[27], which is free
and open source. Otherwise a simple implementation can be developed to customize the
configuration and restrict the functionality to the NETS system’s requirements.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter we reviewed possible solutions to implement in accordance with Chap-
ter 3’s analysis. In Table 4.1 is shown a comparison of the several architectures that were
defined as potential candidates implementable in the NETS system.
Min # Input Conciliation Output Conciliation SPOF(Reliability)
Option 1 2 Port Mirroring Single Switch(High)
Option 2 2 Virtual IP Single -
Option 3 3 Load Distributor Single Server(Medium)
Option 4 4 Virtual IP + Load Distributor Single/Vote -
Table 4.1: Architectures Chart.
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After this analysis we see that the system initially consisted of only one physical
machine, not having any mechanisms for fault tolerance. Details of the resulting imple-
mentations or the lack of them will be presented and explained in the following chapter.

Chapter 5
Implementations
This chapter enumerates the changes and implementations made in the NETS system. A
detailed description of their development and justification is made to review the advan-
tages and possible disadvantages.
5.1 Enhancements of individual components
In this section we will describe the solutions regarding individual components, which
were considered relevant or important and therefore implemented in the NETS system.
These modifications were deemed important to improve the reliability, recoverability
and fault tolerance of each individual node belonging to the NETS system. Therefore,
improving the overall system availability and resilience.
5.1.1 Visualization Improvement - Scripts
The initial interventions on the NETS system were comprised by the development of
several Ruby scripts to extract relevant metrics on the operation of some components
in order to improve the system’s visualization. This information is intended to be dis-
played in dashboards and be used by other applications to issue alarms and reports should
anomalies happen. They were:
• RabbitMQ: Extraction of statistical data of queue sizes, free disk space (in accor-
dance with proposed solution design 4.1.6), number of connections, etc.;
• netstat: We measure metrics related to the TCP and UDP connections through net-
stat, including the number of connections, their state, etc.;
• Cron: Organization and preparation of a general script that is targeted by a cron to
automatically run scripts associated with the NETS system;
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• JVM: The correlation engine uses the JVM, so it was proposed to monitor some
data related to the garbage collection (GC), sizes and proportions of the various
generations of the GC, etc.
These metrics are aggregated by a daemon, statsd, which sends them to be graphed by
Graphite.
5.1.2 Traffic Generator (Stresser)
We identified several tools to test each of the components. From simulating the sources
/ inputs with rsyslog1, must2, sysloggen3 and loggen4 to generate load on MB RabbitMQ
with Tsung5 and JMeter-Rabbit-AMQP6, and finally CEP Esper with it is Performance
Kit.
After reviewing the available applications, the decision of developing custom software
was made for better control, option’s flexibility and available parameters. The code was
written using Ruby, an object-oriented, general-purpose programming language, to take
advantage of the available expertise as a learning opportunity.
Stresser was created to generate load, taking into account several parameters for gen-
erating the messages to be sent. Its primary use is to add load to the sources / inputs
processes and test the limits and behavior of the various components. It is used along the
Fault Injection software detailed in the next topic, simulating the presence of faults and /
or high load, helping to taking steps for the improvement and correction of the system’s
stability, consistency and robustness.
V1 - Basic generation and send mechanisms.
V2 - Added continuous send mode.
V3 - Added memcache support.
V4 - Added configuration files for application and messages.
V5 - Added options to send specific message types.
V6 - Added new type for alarm generation (DSL FLAP).
1http://www.rsyslog.com/
2http://sourceforge.net/projects/mustsyslog/
3https://subversion.assembla.com/svn/logzilla/scripts/contrib/sysloggen/
4http://www.balabit.com/
5http://tsung.erlang-projects.org/
6https://github.com/jlavallee/JMeter-Rabbit-AMQP
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5.1.3 Fault Injection and Behavior Monitoring
Through research in the subject of fault injection and its techniques, Netflix’s Chaos
Monkey[11] crossed our path. It is a service which runs in Amazon Web Services (AWS)
that seeks out Auto Scaling Groups and terminates random instances (virtual machines) in
the group. This methodology is used because failures happen and they inevitably happen
when least desired or expected, testing the capability to tolerate instance failures and its
consequences as well as their recovery ability.
This tool, Chaos Monkey, was not used in NETS but was the inspiration to implement
an application with similar features, and another to register the changes made to the rele-
vant log files when a failure is detected in the system. Both these applications are detailed
below.
NETS Monitor and Monit (Updated rules)
NETS Monitor and a set of scripts were developed to work together with monit in order
to log events related to the NETS system’s applications. When an application stops re-
sponding or crashes, monit resets the application and registers the recent logs that may
have evidence about the problems’ cause.
It is used along with monit to carry out its work, as monit performs the monitoring
and detection of application changes, it calls specific scripts depending on the case, i.e.,
if it is a crash, a CPU overload, etc.
V1 - Rules added for processes, process termination and CPU usage limits.
V2 - Added pid files to detect reboot of processes.
V3 - Added monitoring of RabbitMQ’s process and pid in accordance with proposed
solution design 4.1.4.
V4 - Added monitoring of syslog-ng process and pid in accordance with proposed solu-
tion design 4.1.2.
NETS Faults
NETS Faults is an application to inject random faults in a set of defined processes. It
requires adding the file holding the pid information relative to the application we want to
add to our set which will be target of random faults.
V1 - List of processes, option to finish random or specific processes.
V2 - Added and option to continuously end processes with a defined percentage.
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5.1.4 Configuring RabbitMQ
RabbitMQ’s configuration changed in favor of turning the exchanges’ durability to true.
This modification involved editing the configuration files of etl-syslog and etl-radius, in
which the definitions for the graphite and alarms exchanged were added.
An additional configuration change could involve enabling queue persistence. This
would guarantee that queued messages waiting to be processed are kept even in the event
of a crash.
Another possible configuration involves enabling message persistence and confirma-
tion. With these options enabled, messages would be safe to a greater extent in case of
problematic situations. This would have a slight impact on performance and was deemed
to not being required because clustering solves this particular situation.
5.2 Enhancements at system level
5.2.1 Load Distributor
The Load distributor required the implementation of an application that distributes the
receiving stream to configured and IP addresses. It can be used to support Option 2 of the
architectures described in 4.2.5.
This application requires configuring the desired listening ports, and the IP or IPs
to which a copy of the arriving stream is sent to. Its operation requires connecting to
the target machines and, in the absence of a successful connection, tries to reconnect
periodically.
The development of this software was halted before it was finalized because the cho-
sen architecture will use Option 3, which uses Virtual IP instead of a load distributor.
5.2.2 Monitor for Alarm Transmission State
Standalone application that regulates the transmission of alarms to the SGA. It should be
installed in each NETS machine.
Checks the state of the cluster through RabbitMQ and enables or disables the alarm
transmission by the node taking into account if it should be sending or not, i.e., the one
running correctly with biggest uptime in the cluster. In a correct state, one machine has
the transmission active, the remainders have it disabled.
5.2.3 Introduce Fault Tolerance
Two of the purposed solutions were tested: using a load distributor and Virtual IP attribu-
tion.
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The system is now comprised by two individual physical machines working side by
side and is capable of tolerating a fault in any given machine.
The adopted implementation was Virtual IP attribution in accordance to the proposed
solution design 4.3.3. Custom software was developed to manage the IP address man-
agement and assignment, given that additional configuration was needed in order for the
cluster of RabbitMQs to keep working as intended.
This last implementation is still in test phase, requiring minor tweaking for it to work
according to the system’s needs and remove possible faults in the code.
5.3 Summary
Both individual and system wide improvements have been described in this chapter. The
reasons for their implementations and any advantages are also mentioned.
In the next chapter we will present two evaluations. One that compares the system
state before and after the individual enhancements, and another that makes a system wide
comparison summarizing the main differences and achievements.

Chapter 6
Evaluation
This chapter presents a comparison of the system architecture and state between major
improvements/milestones, showing the differences and benefits accomplished by the en-
hancements explained in the previous chapter.
6.1 Comparison between the initial state and after indi-
vidual improvements
Given the modifications detailed in the previous chapter (Chapter 5), the behavior and
response of the NETS system has improved comparing to the non Fault-tolerant version.
To validate the new implementations, the system was resubmitted to the fault tests
performed while the system was analyzed (as seen in Chapter 3) in order to record its
behavior given the new improvements. The following conclusions were taken:
• Corrections made in the message broker, RabbitMQ, improved its reliability and
recovery. Consequentially, the complex event processor, Esper, also increased its
reliability because of its dependency with the message broker;
• The addition of new rules and missing processes to the monit configuration enables
a better visualization of their status and speeds up the system’s recovery in the
presence of faults;
• Every process in the NETS ecosystem is now capable of automatically restoring
itself to a working condition in case of their failure.
6.2 Comparison between initial condition and improve-
ments at the system level
Initially, the NETS system was composed by a single physical machine with two virtual
machines responsible for the data processing and metrics respectively.
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After the implementation of the new fault tolerant architecture composed by two phys-
ical machines, tests were performed to record the system’s reaction under the new con-
ditions. These tests consisted in simulating a node’s failure in order to force the NETS
system to react to that failure, i.e., the primary node fails and the passive node should be
promoted to primary to ensure the system’s continued work.
The following conclusions were taken:
• Added redundancy, going from a single physical machine to a working cluster com-
posed by two different physical machines, but with the freedom to add more nodes
to the system if needed.
• The stream of events is sent to a single machine, effectively preventing common-
mode failures related to the input, but the filtered data is shared by all members of
the cluster using the message broker’s features. This maintains an updated state in
every node enabling a quick takeover and recovery if the primary node fails.
• Fault tolerance enabled, in the event of a crash or unavailability of the primary node
in the cluster, another node will take over briefly and continue to perform the work
normally, minimizing the system’s unavailability.
• Automatic recovery, should a passive node fail, the primary is unaffected by this
situation and the failed node triggers recovery mechanisms in order to return to a
working condition.
6.3 Summary
The implementations introduced in the system described in the previous chapter resulted
in the improvement of NETS. A review of the expected changes in capabilities taking into
account the context of fault tolerance and dependability is systematized in Table 6.1.
Initial State Individual System Level
Improvements Improvements
# Nodes 1 1 2
Self Monitoring Scale Low Medium High
SPOF X X -
Automatic Recovery - X X
Fault Tolerance - - X
Table 6.1: Milestone Comparison.
In the next chapter we will present the final remarks and conclusions taken during the
project’s time frame.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
The beginning of the project started with an in-depth analysis, what components constitute
the system, their function and dependencies. The system’s architecture was pictured in
a diagram along with the use cases of each major operation that takes place during the
process.
After exploring and having a good notion of the system, development began with
small bug fixes and improvements. Several tools were implemented to test and monitor
the system state while faults were injected, allowing further research and elaboration of
potential strategies to solve the identified situations.
At this point, and after the final single node improvements were made, the node’s
reliability was greatly improved. Not only it became capable of restoring its status to a
correct and working state after the failure of any of its components, it also became more
resilient and fault free.
The final part of the work was related to the introduction of redundancy and thus mak-
ing the system fault tolerant. An additional machine was added to compose a cluster that
works together to generate the intended alarms. The adopted strategy was to use a Virtual
IP that is assigned to the primary node of the cluster. This node is the only one that parses
the stream of events and sends alarms to the SGA, and the resulting messages are mirrored
through all the remaining nodes using the message broker’s embedded capabilities.
In its current state, the system is capable of sustaining one node failure. In the event
of a failure, the remaining node assumes the primary’s role and starts parsing the stream
of events becoming the sole alarms generator. When and if the failed node recovers, it
will rejoin the cluster and serve as the backup if the newly appointed primary fails.
Several tools and methodologies used and developed in the NETS improvement can
be exploited in other projects, especially regarding the configuration and management of
RabbitMQ and Esper along with all the covered fault tolerance topics.
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7.1 Achievements
At the end of the project’s time frame, the work done in the NETS system resulted in the
following achievements:
• The source code of each component was thoroughly analyzed to correct software
bugs and code refactoring in order to improve its performance. This analysis was
also useful to learn what each component does, how it does it and its dependencies;
• New versions of several applications used in the NETS system were available, de-
livering better performance, stability and more features. Their update required code
refactoring and some adaptations but the benefits were considered to be worth the
extra work;
• Failure Detection and Recovery - The NETS system is constituted by a variety of
components, in which the failure of a single one can potentially nullify the entire
operation. Given that continuous operation is a requirement, each component began
to be monitored and, if any should fail, they are restarted in order to return to a
correct working condition;
• Failure Detection - Several software applications were developed to test, monitor
and report the NETS system state. Testing the system required developing an appli-
cation that simulates the incoming sources, in order to easily perform case studies
and learn the system’s performance capabilities. The monitoring and reporting soft-
ware were implemented to improve the monitoring of the NETS system and to log
its state and changes when a failure is detected in order to enable a better analysis
and understanding of the fault’s origin and details.
• Fault Tolerance - Redundancy was introduced making the system fault tolerant.
This required an extra physical machine and a careful analysis of how the incoming
stream of events, the data processing and produced outputs are treated with the new
architecture.
7.2 Future Work
At this point the NETS system can still be improved, some of the available options open
to exploration are suggested taking into account their relevance and natural improvement
progression:
• From Development to Production
The latest implementations related to the addition of redundancy are still in the
development environment, the next logical step is to commit the new modifications
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and integrate them into the production environment. This will require further testing
to assure everything is working as intended.
• Port Mirroring
Given that the final architecture is composed by two physical machines, it would
be interesting to experiment with port mirroring. Having the stream of events being
delivered to the two machines independently would only require monitoring each
other to determine the master without any other dependencies.
• Back-office
The NETS back-office needs further development to expose and have a good moni-
toring view of the system and its alarms state as well as integrating some of the new
metrics retrieved by recent implementations.
• ETL-alarms worker Refactoring
The improvement of ETL alarms worker could be considered given its limited per-
formance.
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Appendix A
UML Activity and Sequence Diagrams
In this section we will be presenting the UML diagrams that cover the NETS system
operation.
In Figure A.1 the operational phases are shown along with the main procedures that
occur within the NETS system. The remainder figures detail the identified procedures in
each phase.
Figure A.1: NETS Phases.
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Figure A.2: Parse Message and Write Log.
Figure A.3: Parse Radius Message.
Figure A.4: Parse Syslog Message.
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Figure A.5: Handle Messages.
Figure A.6: Perform Pattern Matching.
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Figure A.7: Correlate Events.
Figure A.8: Send Esper Metrics.
Figure A.9: Issue Alarm.
Figure A.10: Send Alarm Metrics.
Appendix B
Fault Testing Details
The performance tests were ran in the NETS system using Stresser as the load generator.
The tests targeted each component, registering the amount of messages sent, the CPU and
memory used by the relevant processes, and the consequences to the system.
INFO -r 27 sends about 50-55 messages/second
B.1 DSL
Test began 20 February 2014 at 10:18 using the following command:
ruby st.rb –ip 10.101.68.76 -t 0 -r 27 –type dsl
In Table B.1 there is the detailed progress of the performed test. Each line represents
a record which can be seen as a picture of the system’s current state. The first column
shows the load and time stamp of the record, followed by the CPU and memory of the
relevant processes, finalizing with a column showing if there are lost messages.
Load CPU [Memory] CPU [Memory] CPU [Memory] Request
[Start Time] RabbitMQ etl-syslog Esper Loss Rate
50 [1018] 0.9% [88780 kB] 4.3% [451996 kB] 2.0% [2256400 kB] 0%
100 [1023] 1.1% [91004 kB] 7.1% [483028 kB] 2.5% [2256516 kB] 0%
150 [1028] 1.5% [89744 kB] 10.6% [486948 kB] 3.0% [2256608 kB] 0%
200 [1033] 2.0% [88400 kB] 15.4% [490200 kB] 3.7% [2257096 kB] 0%
250 [1038] 2.3% [88972 kB] 19.0% [488928 kB] 4.1% [2257100 kB] 0%
300 [1043] 2.6% [88336 kB] 22.2% [489504 kB] 4.6% [2257140 kB] 0%
350 [1058] 2.2% [88524 kB] 25.2% [501240 kB] 4.4% [2269552 kB] 33%
400 [1106] 1.6% [89268 kB] 26.6% [508004 kB] 4.1% [2269580 kB] 50%
450 [1115] 1.0% [88944 kB] 28.9% [509460 kB] 3.8% [2269576 kB] 66%
500 [1125] 0.7% [88528 kB] 30.2% [514536 kB] 3.6% [2269580 kB] 100%
Table B.1: DSL Fault Testing
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B.2 STB
Test began 21 January 2014 at 08:50 using the following command:
ruby st.rb –ip 10.101.68.76 -t 0 -r 27 –type stb
Load CPU [Memory] CPU [Memory] CPU [Memory] Request
[Start Time] RabbitMQ etl-syslog Esper Loss Rate
50 [0850] 0.9% [93848 kB] 3.3% [502992 kB] 1.9% [1624796 kB] 0%
100 [0855] 1.2% [91880 kB] 6.8% [511984 kB] 2.5% [1624848 kB] 0%
150 [0900] 1.7% [92488 kB] 11.3% [517892 kB] 3.1% [1624936 kB] 0%
200 [0908] 2.2% [93340 kB] 15.2% [515064 kB] 3.8% [1624940 kB] 0%
250 [0913] 2.5% [93440 kB] 18.7% [517836 kB] 4.2% [1627004 kB] 0%
300 [0918] 2.9% [92492 kB] 22.5% [523444 kB] 4.8% [1627288 kB] 0%
350 [0923] 3.0% [92296 kB] 23.9% [523592 kB] 5.0% [1641520 kB] 33%
400 [0933] 1.6% [93654 kB] 26.6% [534564 kB] 4.1% [1641564 kB] 50%
450 [0943] 1.2% [94792 kB] 29.3% [547248 kB] 3.8% [1641584 kB] 66%
500 [0953] 0.8% [93004 kB] 31.5% [546512 kB] 3.7% [1641584 kB] 100%
Table B.2: STB Fault Testing
Figure B.1: STB Total Processed Messages’ Rate During Test.
B.3 RADIUS
Test began 21 January 2014 at 10:44 using the following command:
ruby st.rb –ip 10.101.68.76 -t 0 -r 27 –type rad
B.4 DSL-FLAP
Test began 10 February 2014 at 15:23 using the following command:
ruby st.rb –ip 10.101.68.76 -t 0 -r 15 –type dsl-flap
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Figure B.2: STB Individual Processed Messages’ Rate During Test.
Figure B.3: RADIUS Total Processed Messages’ Rate During Test.
Figure B.4: RADIUS Individual Processed Messages’ Rate During Test.
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Load CPU [Memory] CPU [Memory] CPU [Memory] Request
[Start Time] RabbitMQ etl-radius Esper Loss Rate
50 [1044] 0.7% [90840 kB] 5.3% [398404 kB] 2.1% [2249800 kB] 0%
100 [1049] 1.1% [93076 kB] 3.4% [438260 kB] 2.4% [2249840 kB] 0%
150 [1054] 1.6% [92748 kB] 5.6% [439004 kB] 3.1% [2260088 kB] 0%
200 [1059] 1.8% [93252 kB] 7.9% [439168 kB] 3.6% [2262600 kB] 0%
250 [1104] 2.1% [92708 kB] 10.1% [439356 kB] 4.2% [2264700 kB] 0%
300 [1109] 2.5% [93036 kB] 12.2% [441528 kB] 4.8% [2268808 kB] 0%
350 [1114] 2.7% [92592 kB] 14.2% [441676 kB] 5.2% [2272912 kB] 0%
400 [1119] 3.0% [94192 kB] 16.5% [443588 kB] 5.8% [2282704 kB] 0%
450 [1124] 3.4% [94016 kB] 18.6% [444044 kB] 6.3% [2299728 kB] 0%
550 [1135] 4.0% [93716 kB] 22.6% [446384 kB] 7.3% [2312020 kB] 0%
600 [1140] 4.2% [94132 kB] 24.5% [448548 kB] 7.9% [2328568 kB] 0%
650 [1145] 4.7% [94912 kB] 26.5% [450728 kB] 8.3% [2340876 kB] 0%
700 [1150] 5.0% [94632 kB] 28.8% [450888 kB] 8.9% [2347020 kB] 0%
750 [1155] 5.5% [95184 kB] 32.0% [453212 kB] 9.6% [2351116 kB] 0%
800 [1200] 6.1% [94720 kB] 36.5% [455208 kB] 10.6% [2359308 kB] 0%
850 [1205] 7.0% [94208 kB] 42.9% [455380 kB] 12.7% [2381836 kB] 0%
900 [1210] 7.2% [94496 kB] 42.6% [462564 kB] 12.6% [2387980 kB] 0%
950 [1215] 7.7% [96620 kB] 43.0% [464732 kB] 14.9% [2394132 kB] 0%
1000 [1220] 7.8% [94920 kB] 46.2% [464925 kB] 14.2% [2400292 kB] 0%
1050 [1225] 7.1% [94604 kB] 43.9% [467116 kB] 11.9% [2410556 kB] 0%
1100 [1230] 8.4% [93436 kB] 47.4% [471756 kB] 14.4% [2433084 kB] >0%
1150 [1240] 7.4% [93852 kB] 45.5% [473988 kB] 14.6% [2482636 kB] >0%
1200 [1250] 7.4% [94668 kB] 45.0% [478248 kB] 13.4% [2503124 kB] >0%
1250 [1300] 8.3% [98396 kB] 47.6% [480448 kB] 15.5% [2517076 kB] >0%
1300 [1310] 8.0% [95216 kB] 46.7% [482596 kB] 14.2% [2529392 kB] >0%
1350 [1320] 7.7% [95020 kB] 46.4% [484804 kB] 13.5% [2543740 kB] >0%
1400 [1330] 3.9% [94060 kB] 41.5% [489004 kB] 8.2% [2553980 kB] >0%
1450 [1340] 6.5% [94068 kB] 46.3% [491428 kB] 12.3% [2562176 kB] >0%
1500 [1350] 4.1% [94628 kB] 41.9% [494632 kB] 8.5% [2564244 kB] >0%
1550 [1355] 3.9% [94140 kB] 42.2% [496772 kB] 8.3% [2566272 kB] >0%
1600 [1400] 4.3% [93440 kB] 42.6% [498928 kB] 8.9% [2570368 kB] >0%
Table B.3: RADIUS Fault Testing
Time Load Message Queueing
1523 2-2.5 No queueing
1528 4.5-5.5 No queueing
1533 6-8 No queueing
1538 10-12 No queueing
1543 14-16 Message queueing starts
Table B.4: DSL-FLAP Testing Times
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Figure B.5: DSL-FLAP Total Alarms in Queue.

Bibliography
[1] rsyslog project website. http://www.rsyslog.com/. [Online; accessed 06-
October-2013].
[2] Advanced Message Queuing Protocol. http://www.amqp.org/. [Online; ac-
cessed 12-October-2013].
[3] Fred R Arndt and CGM Oliver. Hardware monitoring of real-time computer system
performance. Computer, 5(4):25–29, 1972.
[4] Algirdas Avizienis, Jean claude Laprie, Brian R, Carl L, and Senior Member. Basic
concepts and taxonomy of dependable and secure computing. IEEE Transactions
on Dependable and Secure Computing, 1:11–33, 2004.
[5] BFT-SMaRt code repository. https://code.google.com/p/
bft-smart/. [Online; accessed 12-October-2013].
[6] AJ Bourne, GT Edwards, DM Hunns, DR Poulter, and IA Watson. Defences against
common-mode failures in redundancy systems: a guide for management designers
and operators. UKAEA Safety and Reliability Directorate, 1981.
[7] John Bowles and Sharma Upadhyayula. Network management and performance
monitoring. In System Theory, 1991. Proceedings., Twenty-Third Southeastern Sym-
posium on, pages 529–534. IEEE, 1991.
[8] Alan Burns and Andrew J Wellings. Real Time Systems and Their Programming
Languages: Ada 95, Real-time Java and Real-time POSIX. Pearson Education,
2001.
[9] Anto´nio Casimiro, Paulo Verissimo, Diego Kreutz, Filipe Araujo, Raul Barbosa,
Samuel Neves, Bruno Sousa, Marilia Curado, Carlos Silva, Rajeev Gandhi, et al.
Trone: Trustworthy and resilient operations in a network environment. In Depend-
able Systems and Networks Workshops (DSN-W), 2012 IEEE/IFIP 42nd Interna-
tional Conference on, pages 1–6. IEEE, 2012.
[10] Miguel Castro and Barbara Liskov. Practical byzantine fault tolerance and proactive
recovery. ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS), 20(4):398–461, 2002.
81
Bibliography 82
[11] NetFlix’s Chaos Monkey. http://techblog.netflix.com/2012/07/
chaos-monkey-released-into-wild.html. [Online; accessed 10-April-
2014].
[12] Graphite project website. http://graphite.wikidot.com/. [Online; ac-
cessed 06-October-2013].
[13] must project website. http://sourceforge.net/projects/
mustsyslog/. [Online; accessed 06-October-2013].
[14] John D Day and Hubert Zimmermann. The osi reference model. Proceedings of the
IEEE, 71(12):1334–1340, 1983.
[15] Elasticsearch homepage. http://www.elasticsearch.org/. [Online; ac-
cessed 12-October-2013].
[16] Erlang Programming Language. http://www.erlang.org. [Online; accessed
09-October-2013].
[17] Esper project website. http://esper.codehaus.org/. [Online; accessed
06-October-2013].
[18] Didier Essame, Jean Arlat, and David Powell. Padre: A protocol for asymmetric
duplex redundancy. In Dependable Computing for Critical Applications 7, 1999,
pages 229–248. IEEE, 1999.
[19] Statsd project website. http://github.com/etsy/statsd/. [Online; ac-
cessed 06-October-2013].
[20] RabbitMQ project website. http://www.rabbitmq.com. [Online; accessed
06-October-2013].
[21] David C Hoaglin, Frederick Mosteller, and John Wilder Tukey. Understanding ro-
bust and exploratory data analysis, volume 3. Wiley New York, 1983.
[22] Java Programming Language. http://www.java.com. [Online; accessed 09-
October-2013].
[23] JRA Plugin project website. http://github.com/jlavallee/
JMeter-Rabbit-AMQP. [Online; accessed 06-October-2013].
[24] logstash code repository. http://github.com/logstash/logstash. [On-
line; accessed 06-October-2013].
[25] logstash project website and documentation. http://logstash.net/. [On-
line; accessed 06-October-2013].
Bibliography 83
[26] JavaScript Object Notation. http://www.json.org/. [Online; accessed 11-
October-2013].
[27] Keepalived homepage. http://www.keepalived.org/. [Online; accessed
20-April-2014].
[28] Hermann Kopetz. Real-time systems: design principles for distributed embedded
applications. 1997.
[29] Israel Koren and C Mani Krishna. Fault-tolerant systems. 2007.
[30] Jaynarayan H Lala and Richard E Harper. Fault tolerance in embedded real-time
systems: importance and treatment of common mode failures. In Hardware and
Software Architectures for Fault Tolerance, pages 263–282. Springer, 1994.
[31] Leslie Lamport, Robert Shostak, and Marshall Pease. The byzantine generals
problem. ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS),
4(3):382–401, 1982.
[32] Jean-Claude Laprie. Dependable computing and fault-tolerance. Digest of Papers
FTCS-15, pages 2–11, 1985.
[33] Jean-Claude Laprie. Dependability: Basic concepts and associated terminology.
PDCS First Year Report, 1990.
[34] Jean-Claude Laprie. Dependable computing: Concepts, limits, challenges. In FTCS-
25, the 25th IEEE International Symposium on Fault-Tolerant Computing-Special
Issue, pages 42–54, 1995.
[35] Librato metrics storage and visualization. https://metrics.librato.com.
[Online; accessed 12-October-2013].
[36] Chung Laung Liu and James W Layland. Scheduling algorithms for multiprogram-
ming in a hard-real-time environment. Journal of the ACM (JACM), 20(1):46–61,
1973.
[37] Monit project website. http://mmonit.com/monit/. [Online; accessed 06-
October-2013].
[38] David E Morgan, Walter Banks, Dale P Goodspeed, and Richard Kolanko. A com-
puter network monitoring system. Software Engineering, IEEE Transactions on,
(3):299–311, 1975.
[39] David Ernest Morgan and David James Taylor. Special feature a survey of methods
of achieving reliable software. Computer, 10(2):44–53, 1977.
Bibliography 84
[40] David Ernest Morgan, David James Taylor, and G Custeau. A survey of methods for
improving computer network reliability and availability. Computer, 10(11):42–50,
1977.
[41] SJ Mullender. Distributed systems. 1993.
[42] Nagios project website. http://www.nagios.org/. [Online; accessed 07-
October-2013].
[43] Tsung project website. http://tsung.erlang-projects.org/. [Online;
accessed 06-October-2013].
[44] Patrick O’Connor and Andre Kleyner. Practical reliability engineering. John Wiley
& Sons, 2011.
[45] David M Ogle, Karsten Schwan, and Richard Snodgrass. Application-dependent
dynamic monitoring of distributed and parallel systems. Parallel and Distributed
Systems, IEEE Transactions on, 4(7):762–778, 1993.
[46] Anand K Ojha. Techniques in least-intrusive computer system performance moni-
toring. In SoutheastCon 2001. Proceedings. IEEE, pages 150–154. IEEE, 2001.
[47] Laura L Pullum. Software fault tolerance techniques and implementation. Artech
House, 2001.
[48] Brian Randell. System structure for software fault tolerance. Software Engineering,
IEEE Transactions on, (2):220–232, 1975.
[49] Brian Randell. System structure for software fault tolerance. Springer, 1978.
[50] Ruby Programming Language. http://www.ruby-lang.org/. [Online; ac-
cessed 11-October-2013].
[51] Sensu Monitoring Framework. http://sensuapp.org/. [Online; accessed
11-October-2013].
[52] Simple Network Management Protocol. http://www.snmplink.org. [On-
line; accessed 11-October-2013].
[53] Janusz Sosnowski and Marek Poleszak. On-line monitoring of computer systems.
In Electronic Design, Test and Applications, 2006. DELTA 2006. Third IEEE Inter-
national Workshop on, pages 5–pp. IEEE, 2006.
[54] SQL Programming Language. http://www.sql.org/. [Online; accessed 09-
October-2013].
Bibliography 85
[55] Andrew S Tanenbaum and Maarten Van Steen. Distributed systems, volume 2. Pren-
tice Hall, 2002.
[56] TRONE project website. http://trone.di.fc.ul.pt. [Online; accessed
06-October-2013].
[57] Paulo Verissimo and Luis Rodrigues. Distributed systems for systems architects,
volume 1. Springer, 2001.
[58] Dinesh C Verma. Principles of computer systems and network management.
Springer, 2009.
[59] Zenoss project website. http://www.zenoss.com. [Online; accessed 07-
October-2013].
